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Am I My Brother’s Keeper?
A Tax Law Perspective on the Challenge of
Balancing Gatekeeping Obligations and Zealous
Advocacy in the Legal Profession
Richard Lavoie*
Recently the question of whether lawyers have a general ethical
obligation to serve a gatekeeping function has been raised in a number
of legal contexts. The reaction of the practicing bar has generally been
unenthusiastic. While the assertion that a gatekeeping function should
be applicable to all attorneys is a relatively modern stance, such an
obligation has historically been acknowledged to various degrees in
several practice areas, including federal income taxation. This Article
examines the gatekeeping question—and how the practicing bar should
react to it—through an examination of the gatekeeping role historically
asserted as applicable to tax lawyers, including how modern pressures
(e.g., literalist statutory interpretation, profit maximization law firm
models, changing business and societal ethical norms) have altered that
historically asserted ethical norm. This Article then suggests avenues
for combating modern trends in the tax field in order to strengthen and
reestablish the historic balance in a tax lawyer’s planning role (e.g.,
using intentional conflicts of interest to create a “divide and conquer”
dynamic between clients and attorneys in aggressive transactions,
emphasizing the ethical training of tax attorneys, clarifying the proper
approach for statutory interpretation in the tax context, creating
disincentives for a legal race to the bottom among attorneys competing
for business, highlighting the importance of individual trendsetters, and
channeling the competitive pressures in the legal marketplace in the
government’s favor). This Article concludes by suggesting that the
practicing bar should take lessons from the tax gatekeeping example in
its future reactions to gatekeeping initiatives in other legal arenas and
accept gatekeeping as a generally applicable ethical norm.
* Professor, University of Akron School of Law; Dartmouth College, A.B.; Cornell
University, J.D.; New York University, LL.M. (Taxation). I appreciate the helpful comments of
Laurel Terry, Michael Hatfield, and the members of the Law, Society, and Taxation Collaborative
Research Network on earlier drafts of this Article.
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And the LORD said unto Cain, Where is Abel thy brother? And he
said, I know not: Am I my brother’s keeper?
– Genesis 4:9

INTRODUCTION
The essence of the relationship between a lawyer and a client has
traditionally been that of a zealous advocate. As Lord Henry Brougham
famously stated:
An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all
the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all
means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons,
and, amongst them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in
performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the
destruction which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of a
patriot from that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of the
consequences, though it should be his unhappy fate to involve his
country in confusion. 1

In modern times, Lord Brougham’s admonition that a lawyer should
not consider the societal consequences of zealously defending a client
has been questioned. 2 More recently, some have gone even further and
questioned whether lawyers generally have an affirmative obligation to
act as gatekeepers to safeguard the structure and purpose of the law. 3
Such a gatekeeping role does not require lawyers to abandon their
obligation to their clients and assume the role of government regulators,
1. 2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 3 (1821) (emphasis added). To understand the full import of
the emphasized language it is necessary to place Lord Brougham’s statement in its historical
context. Queen Caroline was popular with the masses, but had been charged with adultery.
However, her husband King George IV also had a secret indiscretion. While he was heirapparent, the King had secretly married a Catholic. If this fact became known, the King would
have lost his own title pursuant to the Law of Settlement. The quoted language was part of Lord
Brougham’s opening statement in defense of Queen Caroline and represented a direct threat that
Lord Brougham would not hesitate to produce this evidence against the King if required to defend
his client, no matter the resulting confusion and tumult to the country. Monroe H. Freedman,
Henry Lord Brougham, Written by Himself, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1213, 1215 (2006).
2. See generally David Luban, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988);
DEBORAH RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2000);
Robert Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988); William Simon, The
Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29.
3. See generally JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (2006); Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986); Arthur B. Laby, Differentiating
Gatekeepers, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 119 (2006); W. Bradley Wendel,
Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1167 (2005). The gatekeeping role
envisioned in these works goes well beyond the traditionally accepted notion that a lawyer is an
“officer of the court,” and therefore, among other duties, cannot knowingly make false statements
to a tribunal or fail to disclose controlling adverse authority. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2011) and associated comments.
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but it does envision attorneys taking an evenhanded approach to
interpreting the law when advising clients. A gatekeeping function
seeks to mitigate the excesses that can arise from zealously advancing
client interests by requiring attorneys to counsel clients with an eye
toward promoting respect for the law. While lawyers need not place
themselves in the position of an impartial judge in providing client
advice, they should recognize that they have a duty to uphold the law
and promote its fair operation when assisting clients predisposed to
taking a decidedly myopic view of law. 4 Indeed, in the realm of the
securities laws, Congress and the Securities Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) have moved to require lawyers to assume a proactive
gatekeeping role in policing their clients’ actions via legislation, 5
regulations, 6 and prosecutions. 7
While the idea that gatekeeping is a general obligation of all lawyers
is relatively new, the tax bar in the United States has been debating
whether it has a special gatekeeping obligation almost since the
inception of the income tax. 8 Over most of the modern income tax era,
the prevailing view of commentators has been that the unique nature of
the tax system requires tax lawyers to have an ethical obligation to
create, nurture, and promote a fair tax system. 9 Additionally, as a
4. Wendel, supra note 3, at 1177–78.
5. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006) (directing the SEC to adopt
certain rules of minimum professional conduct for attorneys); 15 U.S.C. § 78d-3(a) (2006)
(allowing administrative actions against attorneys and accountants to censure, suspend, or bar
them from appearing or practicing before the SEC).
6. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1–205.7 (2012) (implementing section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006), which deals with rules of professional responsibility for
attorneys practicing before the SEC); 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2012) (allowing SEC to censure
and bar attorneys from appearing or practicing before the SEC). See also Roger Cramton, George
Cohen & Susan Koniak, Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers after Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L.
REV. 725, 740–41 (2004) (discussing required reporting under section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley).
7. George W. Dent, Jr., Lawyers in the Crosshairs: The New Legal and Ethical Duties of
Corporate Attorneys, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 337, 338 (2007) (“SEC enforcement actions
[against attorneys] have mushroomed. There is also concern that . . . the SEC has altered its
enforcement program, and now under [its censure/suspension authority] it pursues attorneys
allegedly guilty of nothing worse than negligence. Private damage actions against lawyers also
seem to have increased.”).
8. See generally Michael Hatfield, Legal Ethics and Federal Taxes, 1945-1965: Patriotism,
Duties and Advice, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (2012). Indeed, law review discussions regarding how
far a tax practitioner can go in counseling tax reduction strategies to clients can be found as early
as the 1920s. See, e.g., John H. Sears, Effective and Lawful Avoidance of Taxes, 8 VA. L. REV.
77, 85 (1921).
9. See BERNARD WOLFMAN, JAMES P. HOLDEN & KENNETH L. HARRIS, STANDARDS OF TAX
PRACTICE § 101.2 (5th ed. 1999) (“The practitioner’s obligation to the client, however, is not
unrestricted. The practitioner also owes a duty, albeit less well-defined, to the tax system as a
whole.”); Franklin Green, Exercising Judgment in the Wonderland Gymnasium, 90 TAX NOTES
1691, 1692–93 (2001) (“[I]t has been a fundamental role of tax practitioners to identify for
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practical matter, most tax practitioners had likely rendered legal services
in a manner consistent with such a role, even if they did not specifically
endorse gatekeeping as an actual ethical requirement.10 This reality,
however, began to change with the advent of widespread lawyerassisted tax shelter activity in the 1970s and 1990s. Despite academic
protestations to the contrary, an ethical gatekeeping norm has, as both a
formal and practical matter, been increasingly questioned and seemingly
rejected by a large segment of the tax bar in recent decades.11 This lack
of self-regulation has opened the door for the Government12 to insert
taxpayers those tax return positions that may be attempted and those that are beyond the pale . . . .
In a real sense, the tax adviser is a gatekeeper who regulates the flow of issues into the system
. . . . For self-assessment to be workable, tax advisers cannot fail to perform their gatekeeper
function and cannot allow a floodtide of illegitimate issues to swamp the system. Accordingly, it
is imperative that tax advisers apply professional standards with intellectual honesty in
determining what positions have enough credibility to be able to be asserted.”); Deborah H.
Schenk, Tax Ethics, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1995, 2005 (1982) (reviewing BERNARD WOLFMAN &
JAMES P. HOLDEN, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE (1981)); William H. Simon,
Organizational Representation and the Frontiers of Gatekeeping, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 1069, 1073 (2011) (“[T]here is a longstanding tradition within the elite tax bar that
embraces the gatekeeping role . . . .”). For a detailed compendium of the leading tax ethics
commentators on this point from the period between 1945 and 1965, see Hatfield, supra note 8, at
15–28.
10. That is, it was in the professional best interest of the practitioner to be seen by the taxing
authorities as having high standards so that she would be in the best position to represent her
client’s interests and to foster a less adversarial relationship between taxpayers and the
government to everyone’s mutual benefit. Hatfield, supra note 8, at 27–28.
11. See, e.g., Richard Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers: Co-Opting the Tax Bar into
Dissuading Corporate Tax Shelters, 21 VA. TAX REV. 43, 46–47 (2001) [hereinafter Lavoie,
Deputizing the Gunslingers] (discussing attorney complicity in tax shelter activity and advocating
for a return to a tax lawyer gatekeeping function); David J. Moraine, Loyalty Divided: Duties to
Clients and Duties to Others—the Civil Liability of Tax Attorneys Made Possible by the
Acceptance of a Duty to the System, 63 TAX LAW. 169, 169 (2009) (advocating for the rejection
of any tax practitioner duty to the system); Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized
Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter Industry, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 81 (2006) (suggesting that the
organized tax bar’s law reform efforts can be understood as attempts to reinforce the professional
authority of tax attorneys); William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional
Responsibility of the Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1457–58 (2007) (noting the
dichotomy within the tax bar between tax shelter “formalists” and anti-tax shelter practitioners
who assert a duty to the tax system).
12. This Article will use the term “Government” to generally refer to the panoply of
legislative and executive aspects of the federal government that can play a role in regard to
regulating attorneys generally, and in particular tax practitioners. The Internal Revenue Service
itself will sometimes be referred to as either the “IRS” or the “Service.”
In the tax context, federal government action can take many forms, from Congressional
legislation to administrative actions. On the administrative axis, the Treasury Department has
primary responsibility for interpreting and administering the tax laws. Primary responsibility for
developing tax policy and reviewing tax regulations resides in the Treasury’s Office of Tax
Policy. However, the largest bureau within the Treasury Department is the IRS, which is
responsibile for determining, assessing, and collecting the revenue owed by taxpayers. Other
Executive Branch agencies also have ancillary tax functions. For instance, the Tax Division of
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itself into the attorney-client relationship by both implicitly and
explicitly regulating and proscribing attorney behavior. 13 In the wake
of these changes—coinciding with the severe economic downturn
beginning in 2008—promotion of tax shelter activity of the type
prevalent in the 1990s and early 2000s appears to have subsided. 14
Tax shelter activity can take many forms. 15 The factors that led to
the decline of the tax bar’s gatekeeping role in the 1970s and 1990s are
still largely with us today despite recent Government actions. It
remains to be seen whether the next economic upswing will reignite the
tax shelter industry despite recently erected roadblocks. 16 If so, what
the Department of Justice handles most tax litigation functions for the Government.
13. See infra Part III. See also Rachelle Y. Holmes, The Tax Lawyer as Gatekeeper, 49 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 185, 210–12 (2010) (advocating for the Government to do even more to
formalize the gatekeeping functions of tax attorneys); Bret Wells, Voluntary Compliance: “This
Return Might Be Correct but Probably Isn’t,” 29 VA. TAX REV. 645, 668–72 (2010) (advocating
that a “more likely than not” tax return position standard be applicable for all taxpayers and
advisors). For more generalized discussions of the evolving role of the Government in
prescribing the ethical responsibilities of lawyers in various areas, see Fred C. Zacharias,
Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335, 338–44 (1994); Daniel R. Coquillette & Judith
A. McMorrow, Zacharias’s Prophecy: The Federalization of Legal Ethics through Legislative,
Court, and Agency Regulations, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 123, 128–33 (2011); Eli Wald,
Federalizing Legal Ethics, Nationalizing Law Practice, and the Future of the American
Profession in a Global Age, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 489, 514–23 (2011); Laurel S. Terry, The
Future Regulation of the Legal Profession: The Impact of Treating the Legal Profession as
“Service Providers,” 2008 J. PROF. LAW. 189, 193–205 (providing various examples of U.S. and
foreign governments regulating attorney behavior).
14. See Tracy A. Kaye, The Regulation of Corporate Tax Shelters in the United States, 58
AM. J. COMP. L. 585, 604 (2010) (noting that while corporate tax shelter activity has decreased it
is likely to return when the economy improves if the Government is not vigilant); Susan Cleary
Morse, The How and Why of the New Public Corporation Tax Shelter Compliance Norm, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 961, 1013 (2006) (arguing that compliance norms at large corporations were
strengthened by the Government’s responses to the most recent wave of corporate tax shelter
activity).
15. Over the years the tax bar has proved tremendously adept at developing innovative tax
shelter transactions despite Government attempts to stamp out such transactions. As Professor
Martin Ginsberg famously noted, “The tax bar is the repository of the greatest ingenuity in
America, and given the chance, those people will do you in.” Legislation Relating to TaxMotivated Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue
Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong. 90 (1982) (statement of Martin
Ginsberg, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center). Over the years Professor
Ginsberg’s sentiment has frequently been expressed by others as well. See generally JEFFERY L.
YABLON, AS CERTAIN AS DEATH—QUOTATIONS ABOUT TAXES 223–59 (2010) (containing
numerous quotes about tax evasion and planning, including: “Trying to control tax shelters is like
stepping on Jell-O. It just squeezes out between your toes and the mess is worse than when you
began.” – Anonymous Congressional Staff Member; “What the low tax rate on capital gains does
is spur a huge amount of unproductive tax sheltering. . . . Similarly, the highly talented people
who dream up tax shelters could, in a better world, do productive work.” – Leonard E. Burman;
“At the heart of every abusive tax shelter is a tax lawyer or accountant.” – Charles Grassley; and
“As the tax laws get tighter, the tax lawyers get smarter.” – Anonymous).
16. See Kaye, supra note 14, at 604. See also infra note 118 and accompanying text.
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role will tax practitioners play? Will they resume a strong gatekeeping
role and act to quash these new tax shelter schemes in their infancy?
Or, will they adhere to Lord Brougham’s mantra and again plunge the
tax system into disarray and confusion? 17 If the latter, then the tax bar
can expect the Government to place ever more draconian restrictions on
them to dissuade their complicity in undermining the fairness and
integrity of the tax system.
A central thesis of this Article is that it is in the self-interest of all the
parties involved to take decisive action now to return to and strengthen
the tax bar’s historical gatekeeping function. The Government would
benefit by obtaining more accurate taxpayer reporting of transactions
and avoiding the substantial distraction of dealing with yet another tax
shelter crisis. Society would benefit by having a stronger and fairer
system of taxation that in turn bolsters the taxpaying commitment of all
taxpayers. 18 Attorneys would benefit by retaining their ability to selfregulate as a profession, maintaining their status as professionals and
preserving more latitude in assisting their clients in non-abusive tax
situations. 19 Clients benefit from being able to receive freer tax advice
in structuring ordinary business transactions (advice that might be
inadvertently curtailed as a consequence of stricter governmental
involvement in attorney regulation) and by avoiding the time, expense,
and angst of ultimately trying to defend abusive transactions before the
Government and in the court of public opinion. 20
17. See supra note 1 (contextualizing Lord Brougham’s willingness to create a national
controversy in his efforts to zealously represent and protect his client).
18. See generally Richard Lavoie, Flying above the Law and below the Radar: Instilling a
Taxpaying Ethos in Those Playing by Their Own Rules, 29 PACE L. REV. 637 (2009) [hereinafter
Lavoie, Taxpaying Ethos] (concluding that there is a sufficient understanding of “taxpaying
ethos” to warrant testing the principles of this theory, in hopes of reducing noncompliance within
a traditionally problematic part of society).
19. See Kenneth M. Rosen, Lessons on Lawyers, Democracy, and Professional Responsibility,
19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 155, 167 (2006) (“[I]f lawyers are unwilling to recommit themselves to
the regulation of their profession and their responsibilities to society, one might expect additional
regulations [regarding attorney behavior].”); David B. Wilkins, Doing Well by Doing Good? The
Role of Public Service in the Careers of Black Corporate Lawyers, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 83
(2004) (“[S]uch sacred cows as self-regulation and the attorney-client privilege are likely to come
under great pressure if lawyers lose their reputation as a ‘public profession’ dedicated to the
public interest.”).
20. See Michele Destefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion, Installment
One: Broadening the Role of Corporate Attorneys, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259, 1310 (2009).
See also Michele Destefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion, Installment
Two: How Far Should Corporate Attorneys Go?, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1119, 1195 (2010)
(advocating in favor of corporate attorneys providing advice regarding public opinion aspects of
corporate transactions in light of results from an empirical survey study); Kathleen F. Brickey,
From Boardroom to Courtroom to Newsroom: The Media and the Corporate Governance
Scandals, 33 J. CORP. L. 625, 636 (2008) (giving specific examples of media campaigns
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While at one point the gatekeeping concept was thought to be sui
generis to the realm of taxation, that position is no longer viable today.
Over the years the legal environment has evolved from a broad
constitutional and common law base into one increasingly focused on
complex statutory schemes implemented and administered by regulatory
agencies. Thus, the primary factor that prompted calls for tax
gatekeeping (i.e., the practical inability of the Government to
comprehensively check and monitor adherence to the law, which thus
necessitates a system of voluntary self-compliance by citizens) has
emerged as a central reality in most regulatory contexts. The calls we
see today for increased attorney gatekeeping functions in other areas of
the law derive largely from the Government’s recognition that it cannot
effectively curtail unjustified citizen behavior without the help of the
practicing lawyers working in that area to promote compliance by their
clients. 21 Just as in the field of taxation, if those attorneys fail to
embrace a gatekeeping function on their own initiative, the Government
can be expected to impose one on them that may well not be to their or
to their clients’ liking. The primary lesson to be learned from the tax
experience with gatekeeping is the importance of preserving as much of
the attorney-client relationship as possible by embracing self-regulation
as a means of preempting more draconian changes that would otherwise
likely occur.
In discussing the lessons that can be garnered from the tax bar’s
gatekeeping experience, this Article proceeds in three parts. Part I
discusses the history, theory, and practice of gatekeeping within the tax
bar. Part II highlights the decline in such gatekeeping activity as
evidenced by the rampant tax shelter activity in recent times, and
identifies some of the key factors that led to the weakening, and

conducted by defendants and the methods these campaigns employed); David M. Sudbury, The
Role of Corporate Counsel in the Criminal Environmental Case: Advice to Quench the Fire, 3
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 95, 110 (1992) (suggesting that any defense attorney who tells his or her client
to remain publicly silent should be fired).
21. See Jeffrey Manns, Private Monitoring of Gatekeepers: The Case of Immigration
Enforcement, 2006 ILL. L. REV. 887, 894 (“The rationale for enlisting private gatekeepers turns
on the limits of public enforcers and the comparative advantages gatekeepers may enjoy in
overseeing the primary wrongdoers.”); Kraakman, supra note 3, at 61–66 (discussing the
comparative advantage in enforcement obtained by creating gatekeepers to act as “chaperones”
dealing one-on-one with prospective wrongdoers). By way of illustration, attorney gatekeeping
functions have now become part of the Government’s monitoring of compliance with the
securities laws. See supra notes 5–7 (discussing how, through legislation, regulations, and
prosecutions, Congress and the SEC have required lawyers to assume a gatekeeping role).
Similarly, as discussed at note 198, infra, pressure has been mounting in recent years to impose
strict gatekeeping requirements on attorneys to assist the Government in monitoring money
laundering and terrorist financing activities.
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apparent abandonment, of the tax bar’s traditional gatekeeping role.
Part III examines the potential risks to all parties involved if the tax
bar’s gatekeeping role is not resurrected and discusses how a consensus
in favor of an ethical gatekeeping norm can be forged despite
competitive and other pressures pushing the bar in the opposite
direction. The Article concludes by exhorting the tax bar to directly
confront the difficult challenges presented by the current legal
landscape and undertake a concerted effort to entrench a strong
gatekeeping norm to the ultimate mutual benefit of the tax bar, its
clients, and the Government. The Conclusion also observes that the tax
gatekeeping example is highly relevant to other areas of the law where
commentators and the Government are suggesting an attorney
gatekeeping function is appropriate.
I. TAX LAWYERS AS GATEKEEPERS
A. What Does Tax “Gatekeeping” Entail?
Lord Brougham’s standard of zealous advocacy stakes out a clear
threshold for the extent to which an attorney can ethically consider the
consequences of his actions to those other than his client. In short, he
cannot. 22 However, once one grants that an attorney may, or must,
ethically consider consequences beyond those to his client, shades of
gray are introduced into the interpretation of a lawyer’s actions. What
are the parameters that define the scope of the lawyer’s gatekeeping
role? Should the duty be found only in a general duty to work for the
betterment of the law on his own time as a lawyer-citizen, or does the
duty extend to specific client representations? If so, does it only reach
client actions that are clearly accepted as illegal under current law, or
can it intrude into areas where reasonable minds might differ regarding
the legal outcome? At the extreme, must an attorney limit his
involvement to situations where the client’s position is clearly
acceptable under current law?
Even once the relevant scope is identified, what action must or may
an attorney take when weighing his client’s interests against adverse
consequences to others? Is it sufficient to merely bring the tension to
the client’s attention? Or must he counsel against the client’s action? If
the latter, must the practitioner actually withdraw from the

22. Of course, under even an extreme view of the zealous advocacy role, an attorney’s actions
are not completely unfettered. For instance, no one would claim that an attorney should be
ethically permitted to fabricate or destroy evidence, make false statements to a tribunal, or act to
further an ongoing crime. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2011).
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representation if his counsel is ignored? 23 Or does the obligation
(especially if the harmed party would be the Government) run even
deeper, compelling him to affirmatively bring the recalcitrant client’s
actions to the attention of the injured party despite his general duty of
client confidentiality? 24 Finally, to what extent should the gatekeeping
function differ based on the legal context, both in terms of the field of
law involved and the type of advocacy being undertaken?
In the tax field, the answer to these questions has typically been
driven by concerns about dissuading overly aggressive tax planning. 25
There is little dispute regarding a tax attorney’s obligation to deal
truthfully with the Government when responding to inquiries about
underlying facts 26 and to advise his client against taking frivolous or
23. Under present ethical norms, a mandatory withdrawal in this context is limited to
situations where the continued “representation will result in violation of the rules of professional
conduct or other law.” Id. R. 1.16(a)(1). Should the client’s rejection of a lawyer’s gatekeeping
advice be viewed as a violation of rules of professional conduct? Should the permissive right of a
lawyer to withdraw in situations where “the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer
considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement” be made
mandatory to further backstop a gatekeeping ethical norm? Id. R. 1.16(b)(4).
24. Even after withdrawal, an attorney generally must maintain client confidentiality,
notwithstanding the client’s informed consent. Id. R. 1.6(a). The exceptions to this requirement
are typically limited to situations involving a crime or fraud associated with a substantial financial
or bodily injury. Id. R. 1.6(b). Should the ethical rules be expanded to encompass a client’s
rejection of gatekeeping advice associated with legally questionable, but not definitively illegal or
fraudulent, client actions?
25. See Holmes, supra note 13, at 187 (“[T]he line between legitimate tax planning . . . and
overly aggressive or abusive reporting by taxpayers continues to get pushed.”); Marjorie E.
Kornhauser, Legitimacy and the Right of Revolution: The Role of Tax Protests and Anti-Tax
Rhetoric in America, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 819, 874 n.153 (2002) (“The difference between tax
avoidance and tax evasion is that the latter is illegal, while the former is just smart tax planning.
The boundary between the two is blurry.”); Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers, supra note 11, at
49 (“The inherent tension between legitimate tax planning and the creation of abusive tax shelters
presents [a] line drawing exercise: which transactions should the tax law dissuade and prohibit as
abusive, and which transactions should the tax law permit as attempts to work within the statutory
framework toward the goal of legitimate tax minimization?”).
26. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 10.20 (2011) (“A practitioner must, on a proper and lawful request
by a duly authorized officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service, promptly submit
records or information in any matter before the Internal Revenue Service unless the practitioner
believes in good faith and on reasonable grounds that the records or information are privileged.”);
31 C.F.R. § 10.51 (2011) (explicitly noting that a practitioner may be censured, suspended, or
disbarred from practice before the IRS for “[g]iving false or misleading information, or
participating in any way in the giving of false or misleading information to the Department of the
Treasury or any officer or employee thereof, or to any tribunal authorized to pass upon Federal
tax matters, in connection with any matter pending or likely to be pending before them, knowing
the information to be false or misleading”). Of course, the rules of professional conduct explicitly
state that an attorney shall not knowingly make a false statement of any material fact to any party
in representing a client. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1. See also ABA Comm. on
Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-375 (1993) (titled “The Lawyer’s Obligation to
Disclose Information Adverse to the Client in the Context of a Bank Examination,” this opinion
found that an attorney representing a client in the context of a governmental agency investigation
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patently improper tax positions. 27 Conversely, when a tax matter
proceeds to actual litigation, the accepted view has been that a tax
lawyer’s obligations are the same as in any other type of litigation. 28
The questions become harder when a tax lawyer is consulted in the
planning stages of a transaction, where the legal questions presented
rarely have clear-cut answers. The role of the tax lawyer is to sort
through the extant authorities and utilize her experience and judgment
in determining the legal strength of a given tax position. 29 The analysis
is multifaceted, involving not just an intimate understanding of the
particular statutory and regulatory provisions involved, but also a keen
appreciation for the policy considerations underlying the rules, the nontax business motivations of the client, and the anticipated reaction of the
judiciary if litigation ultimately ensues. Despite this grounding, the
lawyer’s view of the advisability of a transaction may often appear to a
layman as simply a “smell test” akin to an “I know it when I see it”
obscenity-like standard. 30 The key, however, is that the grounding of
the analysis should create a commonality in approach that leads most
practitioners to reach similar conclusions regarding the appropriateness
of any given transaction. 31 As discussed in this Article, the scope of tax
“may not under any circumstances lie to or mislead agency officials, either by affirmative
misstatement or by omitting a material fact necessary to assure that statements made are not false
or misleading”).
27. As discussed herein, even with its most liberal interpretation, the bar has maintained that a
tax return reporting position must have at least a “reasonable basis” for a practitioner to advise in
its favor. See infra at Part II.A.1 (discussing ABA Formal Opinion 314). While the “reasonable
basis” standard used in that opinion was interpreted by some as requiring only a “colorable basis”
for a position, the position still could not be completely frivolous. ABA Comm. on Ethics &
Prof’l Responsibility Formal Op. 85-352 (1985) (titled “Tax Return Advice: Reconsideration of
Formal Opinion 314,” this opinion explained the need for clarifying the standard announced in
Opinion 314). Again, this also accords with the acknowledged limits to the zealous advocacy
norm generally. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (“A lawyer shall not bring or
defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact
for doing so that is not frivolous.”).
28. See Hatfield, supra note 8, at 52 (describing several different professors who agree that tax
lawyers, when engaged in adversarial litigation, are involved in a process much like that
experienced by typical attorneys). As noted earlier, however, in recent times commentators have
begun to question the extent to which a strong zealous advocacy standard is appropriate even in
pure litigation settings. See supra note 2.
29. Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., The Range of Legal Tax Opinions, with Emphasis on the
“Should” Opinion, 98 TAX NOTES 1125, 1125 (2003); Frank J. Gould, Giving Tax Advice—Some
Ethical, Professional, and Legal Considerations, 97 TAX NOTES 523, 529 (2002); Richard
Lavoie, Analyzing the Schizoid Agency: Achieving the Proper Balance in Enforcing the Internal
Revenue Code, 23 AKRON TAX J. 1, 20 (2008); Detlev F. Vagts, Legal Opinions in Quantitative
Terms: The Lawyer as Haruspex or Bookie?, 34 BUS. LAW. 421, 421 (1979).
30. Dana L. Trier, Beyond the Smell Test: The Role of Substantive Anti-Avoidance Rules in
Addressing the Corporate Tax Shelter Problem, 78 TAXES 62, 62 (2000).
31. Richard Lavoie, Activist or Automaton: The Institutional Need to Reach a Middle Ground
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gatekeeping is primarily centered on this gray area of aggressive taxmotivated planning. 32
Within that scope, determining how strong a position needs to be
before it can be ethically advised has been a matter of debate over the
years. Depending on the time period and the context, the answer has
changed dramatically. As discussed more fully in Part III, the
Government’s return preparer penalty provisions now provide that, in
essence, 33 a tax advisor needs a reasonable belief that an advised
position more likely than not would be sustained if there is either (1) a
significant purpose of a plan or arrangement to avoid or evade federal
income tax or (2) the transaction meets certain criteria causing it to
qualify as a specifically reportable transaction. 34 If the underlying
transaction does not have a significant tax avoidance purpose, then an
undisclosed position still must be supported by “substantial
authority,” 35 and a position that will be adequately disclosed by the
taxpayer on his tax return must have a “reasonable basis.” 36 A tax
in American Jurisprudence, 68 ALB. L. REV. 611, 625–26 (2005).
32. See infra Part II.A (discussing the decline of tax gatekeeping and the rise of lawyerfacilitated tax shelter activity).
33. The statutory standard discussed here, section 6694, only applies to a person who prepares
at least a substantial portion of a tax return or claim for refund for compensation. 26 U.S.C. §
7701(a)(36)(A) (2006). However, the Treasury Department’s rules governing practice before the
Internal Revenue Service (“Circular 230,” codified at 31 C.F.R. subtit. A, pt. 10 (2011)) are
significantly broader and provide that “a practitioner may not willfully, recklessly, or through
gross incompetence” advise a client to take a position on a tax return or claim for refund unless
the section 6694 certainty standards are met. 31 C.F.R. § 10.31(a)(1)(ii) (2011). Additionally,
the relevant penalty provisions directly applicable to taxpayers reflect substantially the same
certainty standards as well, and thus the advice that a practitioner will provide to a taxpayer about
the certainty of a position will obviously be shaped in the context of instructing the taxpayer
regarding his own penalty exposure. 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B) (2006).
34. 26 U.S.C. § 6694(a)(2)(C) (2006). Some commentators have advocated for adopting a
“more likely than not” standard generally for all tax advice. See Wells, supra note 13, at 645
(explaining the “more likely than not” standard with regard to the Affordable Health Care for
America Act).
35. 26 U.S.C. § 6694(a)(2)(A) (2006), as amended by Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3880
(2008). The substantial authority standard is described in the relevant regulations as falling
between the reasonable basis standard and the more likely than not standard. 26 C.F.R. § 1.66624(d) (2012). While assigning mathematical probabilities to such standards is fraught with peril,
substantial authority has been pegged at roughly a 40% chance of success on the merits. Linda
M. Beale, Tax Advice before the Return: The Case for Raising Standards and Denying
Evidentiary Privileges, 25 VA. TAX REV. 583, 594 n.27 (2006); Michael Doran, Tax Penalties
and Tax Compliance, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 111, 119 (2009); J. Timothy Philipps, It’s Not Easy
Being Easy: Advising Tax Return Positions, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 589, 606 (1993); Burgess
Raby & William Raby, “Reasonable Basis” v. Other Tax Opinion Standards, 73 TAX NOTES
1209, 1209 (1996).
36. 26 U.S.C. § 6694(a)(2)(B), as amended by Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3880 (2008).
Reasonable basis is defined as “a relatively high standard of tax reporting, that is, significantly
higher than not frivolous or not patently improper.” Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3 (as amended in
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return preparer that violates these guidelines is subject to penalty. 37
Tax attorneys who do not meet the requirements of a return preparer
may still find themselves in violation of the Government’s rules for
practice before the Internal Revenue Service. 38 In any event, an
attorney violating these guidelines might be open to malpractice claims
from his client. 39 As a result, if an attorney firmly believes a client’s
intended tax reporting of a transaction would violate these standards, it
is unlikely that the attorney would continue to represent the client. 40
In many such cases, however, the decision regarding whether the
relevant reporting standards would be violated is a close one. In those
situations, an attorney who views her role as a zealous advocate (or
more cynically, whose economic interests are tied to allowing the client
to proceed) might be more inclined to color her assessment of the
transaction in the client’s favor. This is where a strong gatekeeping
ethical norm would encourage practitioners to hew to a more
conservative view of the issue and thereby dissuade more questionable
transactions at the margin. But, should tax attorneys undertake such a
gatekeeping function when doing so is arguably detrimental to their
clients’ interests?
B. Justifications for Tax Gatekeeping
A number of arguments have been made to support a gatekeeping
role for tax attorneys. Some have reasoned that because taxes are used
for the benefit of society and taxpayers have an interest in seeing that
taxes are paid, the relationship between taxpayer and Government is not
a truly adversarial one, and therefore the zealous advocacy norms that
2003). The regulations explain that it is not satisfied by a position that is “merely colorable” or
“merely arguable”; however, if the position is based on one of the authorities set out in section
1.6662–4(d)(3)(iii) (as amended in 2003) of the Treasury Regulations (taking into account the
relevance and persuasiveness of the authorities, and subsequent developments), the return
position will generally satisfy the reasonable basis standard even though it may not satisfy the
substantial authority standard. Most commentators peg the reasonable basis standard as
indicating an approximately 20% or greater chance of success on the merits. See supra note 35
and accompanying text.
37. Section 6694 provides a penalty for a tax return or refund claim equal to the greater of
$1,000 or 50% of the income derived by the return preparer from the subject return or claim. 26
U.S.C. § 6694(a)(1).
38. 31 C.F.R. § 10.31(a)(1)(ii) (2011). See supra note 33 (discussing the extension of the
return prepare standards to advice regarding a return position under Circular 230).
39. Jay Soled, Tax Shelter Malpractice Cases and Their Implications for Tax Compliance, 58
AM. U. L. REV. 267, 268–69 (2008).
40. An attorney is generally permitted to withdraw from representing a client in a number of
situations, including a situation where “the client insists upon taking action . . . with which the
lawyer has a fundamental disagreement.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(4)
(2011).
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would apply to a normal civil controversy should not apply in the tax
law setting. 41 Others have noted that tax practitioners are subject to
direct regulation by the Government, 42 and can therefore be said to owe
duties to the Government due to this special relationship. 43 A crasser
justification is that gatekeeping helps lawyers maintain their personal
reputation vis-à-vis the Government and therefore gatekeeping is in
their personal interest, as well as indirectly in the general interest of all
their current and future clients. 44
However, the primary justification for a gatekeeping role in tax
practice arises from the very nature of our tax system. The hallmark of
the U.S. income tax system is its self-assessment nature. 45 That is,
taxpayers determine how the tax law applies to their particular situation
and then calculate and pay their tax liability accordingly. 46 Taxpayers
have the initial burden to apply the law correctly to their personal
situations. Indeed, in filing tax returns, taxpayers must affirm under
penalties of perjury their belief that the return is “true, correct and
41. Hatfield, supra note 8, at 16. Of course, while this is true in the abstract, once any
particular tax dispute arises, the specific taxpayer involved will either pay more or less depending
on the outcome and therefore, at least in a controversy setting the relationship between the
taxpayer and the Government, is fully as adversarial as in any other litigation.
42. The Secretary of the Treasury has authority to regulate the conduct of, and to discipline,
practitioners appearing before it. 31 U.S.C. § 330 (2006). Pursuant to this authority, Circular
230, codified at title 31, subtitle A, part 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, sets forth detailed
rules governing practice before the IRS and establishes a Director of the Office of Professional
Responsibility to implement them and monitor practitioner compliance.
43. Hatfield, supra note 8, at 18. Of course, Circular 230 technically only governs practice
before the IRS. Consequently, prior to 2004, some argued that these rules did not cover
practitioners providing tax planning advice because practice before the IRS only covered audit
defense, tax controversy work and other direct dealings with IRS personnel. See, e.g., Ben Wang,
Note, Supplying the Tax Shelter Industry: Contingent Fee Compensation for Accountants Spurs
Production, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1237, 1266 (2003) (arguing that Circular 230 is limited in scope
and does not apply to tax planning advice). Therefore, any gatekeeping obligation arising from
Circular 230 would be limited to those controversy-related contexts. To address this issue,
Congress added Subsection (d) to 31 U.S.C. § 330 to explicitly bring “written advice with respect
to any entity, transaction plan or arrangement, or other plan or arrangement, which is of a type
which the Secretary determines as having a potential for tax avoidance or evasion” within the
ambit of Circular 230. Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 822(b), 118 Stat. 1418, 1587 (2004).
Additionally, in 2005 Circular 230 was amended to provide “aspirational” best practices for
practitioners providing tax advice generally. 31 C.F.R. § 10.33 (2011).
44. Hatfield, supra note 8, at 27–28.
45. See, e.g., Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 176 (1957) (“Our system of taxation is
based upon voluntary assessment and payment, not upon distraint.”); Joseph J. Darby,
Confidentiality and the Law of Taxation, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 577, 577 (1998) (“The United States
enjoys what is quite probably the most successful tax collection system in the world. It is based
on the principle of voluntary self-assessment.”).
46. Doran, supra note 35, at 113; Richard Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law: The
Judiciary’s Role in Fostering Unethical Behavior, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 115, 176 (2004)
[hereinafter Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law].
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complete.” 47 Of course, our tax laws are complex and understanding
them in concept, let alone how they apply and interrelate in a given fact
pattern, is often unclear. Consequently, taxpayers look to, and the
efficient functioning of the tax system relies on, the advice of tax
practitioners to guide them to the most appropriate interpretation of the
law. Note that the taxpayer has the legal duty to report her correct tax
based on the facts and relevant law. 48 Consequently, the goal of
reporting the correct tax should also be the guiding principle for the tax
adviser. 49
The gatekeeping responsibility of the tax lawyer is not just premised
on helping the client meet the legal obligation of arriving at the correct
tax, but also on the Government’s inability to adequately double-check
each taxpayer’s initial tax determination. Each year the Government
can audit only a small fraction of all taxpayer returns. 50 If taxpayers
routinely report their taxes based on the most aggressive interpretation
of the law, instead of an evenhanded one, then the fisc will be harmed.
Further, as the magnitude of such aggressive reporting increases, it
breeds disrespect for the law and encourages others to push the

47. See, e.g., IRS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FORM 1040 (2012), available at http://www.
irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040.pdf (illustrating the way in which taxpayers calculate their respective
tax burdens); IRS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FORM 1120 (2012), available at http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1120.pdf (noting that U.S. Corporation Income Tax Returns require
signature under penalty of perjury). In addition to general perjury consequences, this jurat also
subjects a taxpayer to potential felony prosecution if the taxpayer signs the jurat and “does not
believe [the return] to be true and correct as to every material matter.” 26 U.S.C. § 7206 (2006).
48. Breland v. United States, 323 F.2d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1963) (stating that a taxpayer has the
obligation “to keep books and records of his income for the purpose of determining the correct
amount of income taxes due and payable”); United States v. Norton, 250 F.2d 902, 905 (5th Cir.
1958) (“[The] duty to return and pay the correct tax rests on the taxpayer.”); Conforte v. Comm’r,
74 T.C. 1160, 1178 (1980) (“[T]he self-assessment system place the responsibility of maintaining
records and substantiating claimed deductions upon the taxpayer.”). Of course, reasonable minds
might differ regarding the extent to which a taxpayer can resolve legal uncertainties in her own
favor in arriving at a decision regarding her “correct” tax liability. See, e.g., Calvin Johnson,
“True And Correct:” Standards for Tax Return Reporting, 43 TAX NOTES 1521, 1522–30 (1989)
(considering various legislative proposals to clarify taxpayer positions and supporting selfassessment); Beale, supra note 35, at 594 (noting “the ambiguity of the existing rules regarding
taxpayer’s obligation” to report their income and tax liabilities).
49. See Myron C. Grauer, What’s Wrong with This Picture?: The Tension between Analytical
Premises and Appropriate Standards for Tax Practitioners, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 353, 358 (1991)
(opining that a practitioner’s duties derive from taxpayers’ duty to file true and correct tax
returns); Gwen Thayer Handelman, Counseling Ordered Liberty: Reply to a Commentary, 9 VA.
TAX REV. 781, 781–86 (1990) (explaining that a practitioner’s reporting position obligations are
derivative of the client’s duties to comply with the tax laws).
50. Only 0.9% of all tax returns were subjected to audit in the Government’s 2011 fiscal year.
IRS, 2011 DATA BOOK 22 (2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/11databk.pdf.
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envelope. 51 This byproduct would be a weight our tax system could not
bear.
Moreover, when tax practitioners are involved in planning
transactions or assisting taxpayers in developing their reporting
positions for a completed transaction, it is questionable whether such
work is truly adversarial, as that term has traditionally been interpreted.
Our adversarial system of justice contemplates a competition among
equals that is intended to efficiently and fairly yield the “truth.” 52 Thus,
having a taxpayer make colorable arguments regarding his proper tax
burden is justifiable once the issue has been joined with the Government
(either administratively or in litigation), but making those identical
claims on an initial tax return, when no adversary has yet entered the
ring, impedes the arrival at a fair result.
As one commentator noted:
[The] fundamental role of tax practitioners [is] to identify for
taxpayers those tax return positions that may be attempted and those
that are beyond the pale . . . . In a real sense, the tax adviser is a
gatekeeper who regulates the flow of issues into the system . . . . For
self-assessment to be workable, tax advisers cannot fail to perform
their gatekeeper function and cannot allow a floodtide of illegitimate
issues to swamp the system. Accordingly, it is imperative that tax
advisers apply professional standards with intellectual honesty in
determining what positions have enough credibility to be able to be
asserted. 53

Of course, determining exactly how weak a position must be to trigger
this gatekeeper intervention is a highly relevant question that has been
the subject of much debate. But defining the relevant threshold is a
question intellectually distinct from whether there should be a
gatekeeping obligation at all.
C. Arguments against Tax Gatekeeping
Although the existence of a tax gatekeeping obligation has
traditionally been acknowledged by many in the tax bar, 54 there has
51. Lavoie, Taxpaying Ethos, supra note 18, at 655–60.
52. Edward F. Barrett, The Adversary System and the Ethics of Advocacy, 37 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 479, 479–80 (1962).
53. Green, supra note 9, at 1692–93.
54. BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 9, § 101.2; Mortimer M. Caplin, Responsibilities
of the Tax Advisor—A Perspective, 40 TAXES 1030, 1032 (1962); Frederic G. Corneel, Guidelines
to Tax Practice Second, 43 TAX LAW. 297, 301–02 (1990); Michael C. Durst, The Tax Lawyer’s
Professional Responsibility, 39 FLA. L. REV. 1027, 1028, 1031 n.9, 1050 n.81 (1987); Linda
Galler, The Tax Lawyer’s Duty to the System, 16 VA. TAX REV. 681, 687–98 (1997) (reviewing
BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE (1995)); Anthony
C. Infanti, Eyes Wide Shut: Surveying Erosion in the Professionalism of the Tax Bar, 22 VA. TAX

6_LAVOIE

2013]

3/9/2013 1:36 PM

Am I My Brother’s Keeper?

829

always been a segment of the bar that rejected this proposition, 55
including some very well-known tax lawyers. 56 While there are
variations of degree, the primary argument against a gatekeeping role
for tax attorneys is grounded in the zealous advocacy norm. At the
extreme, some have expressed libertarian fears of the Government
acting as “Big Brother” through attorneys being required to report on
their own clients. 57 For others, the rejection of any gatekeeping role has
arisen from blind allegiance to the concept that the role of a lawyer is
purely to serve his client’s interests without any moral judgment. 58
Others have viewed any weakening of a strong zealous advocacy
norm as holding out the prospect of creating intolerable conflicts of
interest between attorneys and their clients due to the attorney’s
competing obligation to the Government. 59 A more nuanced version of
this claim is that a client’s knowledge of his attorney’s dual obligations
would make the client less forthcoming with underlying facts and
REV. 589, 606 (2003); John M. Maguire, Conscience and Propriety in Lawyer’s Tax Practice, 13
TAX L. REV. 27, 36 (1957); Francis C. Oatway, Motivation and Responsibility in Tax Practice:
The Need for Definition, 20 TAX L. REV. 237, 254 (1965); Loren D. Prescott, Jr., Challenging the
Adversarial Approach to Taxpayer Representation, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 693, 715 (1997);
Schenk, supra note 9, at 2005; David M. Schizer, Enlisting the Tax Bar, 59 TAX L. REV. 331, 338
(2006); Thomas N. Tarleau, Ethical Problems in Dealing with Treasury Representatives, 8 TAX
L. REV. 10, 11 (1952); Randolph W. Thrower, Preserving the Integrity of the Federal Tax
System, 33 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 707, 709–10 (1975); Johnnie M. Walters, Ethical and
Professional Responsibilities of Tax Practitioners, 17 GONZ. L. REV. 23, 24–26 (1981); Ann
Southworth, Note, Redefining the Attorney’s Role in Abusive Tax Shelters, 37 STAN. L. REV. 889,
891, 908–12, 918 (1985).
55. See, e.g., Mark Johnson, Does the Tax Practitioner Owe a Dual Responsibility to his
Client and to the Government?—The Theory, 15 U.S.C. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 25 (1963) (arguing
that a tax attorney’s primary responsibility is owed to his or her client); Moraine, supra note 11,
at 190 (noting controversy over whether tax lawyers have a gatekeeping function); Camilla E.
Watson, Legislating Morality: The Duty to the Tax System Reconsidered, 51 KAN. L. REV. 1197
(2003) [hereinafter Watson, Duty Reconsidered] (opining that if there is a duty to the tax system,
clear normative expectations are necessary); Camilla E. Watson, Tax Lawyers, Ethical
Obligations, and the Duty to the System, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 847, 851, 871, 909 (1999) (arguing
that there is “no discrete duty owed by the lawyer qua lawyer either to society or to the tax
system”).
56. E.g., Boris I. Bittker, Professional Responsibility and the Preparation of Federal Income
Tax Returns, in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 245, 270 (Boris I.
Bittker ed., 1970); Randolph E. Paul, The Lawyer as a Tax Advisor, 25 ROCKY MTN. L. REV.
412, 429 (1953).
57. Hatfield, supra note 8, at 22.
58. Rick Taylor, Rusty Pipes Is Simply Rusty, Says Tax Practitioner, TAX NOTES TODAY, July
11, 1994, LEXIS 94 TNT 135–46 (“I will do everything that I can to be absolutely certain that my
clients do not pay one dime more tax than is absolutely required! That is what I was trained to do
and that is what my clients pay me to do. To accuse me or anyone else in the tax community of
not “playing fair” and to demand that I somehow overlook planning ideas in the name of morals
is, in the words of Judge Learned Hand, ‘mere cant.’”).
59. Moraine, supra note 11, at 190.
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motivations. As a result the lawyer’s legal advice would be skewed. At
the extreme clients concerned about the dual obligations might not seek
legal advice at all. 60 Weakening the zealous advocacy norm, even in a
planning context, undermines the bedrock taxpayer compliance required
for the self-assessment system to function. 61 Intriguingly, this argument
contains an internal contradiction. The argument maintains that a
gatekeeping role will dissuade taxpayers from seeking legal advice (or
hiding the true facts when seeking advice) and, as a result, taxpayers
will take unjustified positions. The implication is that, in the absence of
a gatekeeping obligation, taxpayers would get full, unfettered, protaxpayer advice, and yet the taxpayers would take fewer unjustified
positions. Why would that be the case unless the presence of the
attorney in fact did dissuade unwarranted taxpayer positions, implicitly
recognizing that the attorneys must be performing at least some
gatekeeping despite their purported zealous advocacy?
The interesting commonality between the traditional arguments for
and against a gatekeeper role is that both sets of arguments largely
devolve into a debate about the scope of the zealous advocacy norm and
its appropriateness outside of a litigation or controversy context. 62
60. Johnson, supra note 56, at 30–31.
61. Id. at 30.
62. The theoretical underpinnings of the zealous advocacy norm have been the subject of
extensive commentary since the 1970s. David Luban, Misplaced Fidelity, 90 TEX. L. REV. 673,
673 (2012). An important contribution of this literature was the identification of three defining
characteristics of the adversary system: (1) partisanship (zealously making all available
arguments for your client); (2) neutrality (without regard to moral implications or possible injury
to others); and (3) nonaccountability (and without moral censure to the attorney for doing so). Id.
at 673–74. Identifying these factors led directly to observations regarding the central importance
of having an independent arbiter involved as part of the adversary system. Murray L. Schwartz,
The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669, 677–78 (1978). This
insight prompted serious questions regarding the appropriateness of adhering to a zealous
advocacy norm (and the concomitant lack of moral responsibility on behalf of attorneys) in
contexts where an independent arbiter was lacking. LUBAN, supra note 3; Stephen L. Pepper, The
Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 613; Schwartz, supra, at 677–78. In recent years this discussion of the proper
role of zealous advocacy outside traditional adversary system contexts has continued. See
generally TIM DARE, THE COUNSEL OF ROGUES? A DEFENSE OF THE STANDARD CONCEPTION
OF THE LAWYER’S ROLE (2009) (arguing in favor of the use of zealous advocacy as a generally
applicable norm); W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW (2010) (arguing that,
beyond traditional adversarial proceedings, attorneys should moderate zealous advocacy to
uphold their duty to fairly apply the relevant law); Katherine R. Kruse, Lawyers, Justice, and the
Challenge of Moral Pluralism, 90 MINN. L. REV. 389, 391–93 (2005) (developing a conflict of
interest approach for resolving situations where an attorney’s moral instincts run counter to his
client’s); Katherine R. Kruse, The Jurisprudential Turn in Legal Ethics, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 493,
496 (2011) (recasting questions regarding the role of the adversary system in jurisprudential,
rather than moral terms); Wendel, supra note 3, at 1169–70 (arguing that outside of traditional
adversary settings attorneys should temper zealous advocacy norms in favor of upholding a duty
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Those resisting a special gatekeeping obligation for tax practitioners
often ground their opposition in part on the premise that the ethical
obligations of attorneys should be the same regardless of their field. 63
As discussed earlier, this Article, and the recent evolution in legal ethics
generally, favor the contrary position: that it is appropriate to modify
the zealous advocacy norm in non-adversarial contexts. 64 Thus, the
traditional arguments against a specific tax gatekeeping duty are weaker
today than was true historically; the perception of the lawyer’s role in
non-adversarial contexts generally has undergone a transformation.
D. The Practical Approach
Beyond those actively arguing whether tax lawyers have a
gatekeeping duty, a third segment of the tax bar has historically taken
the position that the entire question is merely a matter of academic
interest. 65 That is, the general obligation of taxpayers to file a correct
return and other specific Government rules regarding factual disclosures
by taxpayers and their representatives are sufficient to ensure taxpayer
compliance with the self-assessment system without any need to imply
any additional duty on tax practitioners. 66 Further, some have argued
that as a matter of practical lawyering, most tax advisors would counsel
their clients to act prudently in any event, whether or not any specific
gatekeeping obligation actually existed. As one commentator stated:
[Y]ou are never really up against the gun to determine whether the
practitioner does have dual responsibilities [to his client and to the
government], but that it is just good business for you, for the client
and for the government to try to minimize adversary aspects just as
much as possible, and to increase the disclosure aspects just as much
as possible, and thereby to improve relationships among the three of
you as much as possible. . . . [It is a] mere academic exercise when
we discuss the degree to which there is this dual relationship . . . [but]
it is in our best interest to act as if there were a dual responsibility. 67

Thus, as a practical matter, through the mid-1960s, many tax attorneys
implicitly exercised a gatekeeping function, irrespective of whether they
acknowledged an actual ethical obligation to do so.

to the fair application of the relevant body of law).
63. Hatfield, supra note 8, at 22–24.
64. See supra notes 2–3.
65. Hatfield, supra note 8, at 27–28.
66. Id. at 31–32.
67. Id. at 27.
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II. THE DECLINE OF TAX GATEKEEPING
A. The Rise of Lawyer-Facilitated Tax Shelter Activity
The tax bar’s prevailing gatekeeping norm began to noticeably
weaken with the wave of tax shelters focused on individual taxpayers
that swept the country in the 1970s, and then dissipated further with the
wave of corporate tax shelters that occurred in the 1990s. Both periods
were characterized by the use of legal opinions to bless highly
aggressive tax avoidance transactions. 68 In each situation, the tax bar
was unable, or unwilling, to stem the tax shelter tide. This failure
resulted in increased regulation of tax opinion practice by the
Government, as well as changes to the statutory penalty provisions
applicable to taxpayers. These tax shelter waves provide stark evidence
of the abdication of the traditional gatekeeping function by a significant
portion of the tax bar.
1. The Tax Shelters of the 1970s
Up through 1965, the prevailing (although by no means monolithic)
position of the tax bar, as evidenced by the commentary of the time and
actual prudent practice, was to endorse a gatekeeping function. 69 In
1965, the American Bar Association (ABA) Ethics Committee, in
Formal Opinion 314 (“1965 Opinion”), seriously challenged this
prevailing ethical norm. 70 The 1965 Opinion took the position that,
since disputes with the Government regarding a taxpayer’s tax liability
were adversarial, and the taxpayer’s filing of a tax return was the first
step in any ultimate dispute, a lawyer ethically should resolve doubts in
favor of the client in pre-return tax planning. 71 Further, the 1965
Opinion refused to treat the Government as a “tribunal” to which a
higher duty of disclosure would be required. 72 The bottom line
assessment in the 1965 Opinion was that a lawyer could ethically advise
a client to take any position without any highlighting disclosure as long
68. See generally Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Tax Shelter Opinions Threatened the Tax System in
the 1970s, 111 TAX NOTES 947 (2006) (describing the role of tax opinions in the tax shelters of
the 1970s and 1980s); Rostain, supra note 11, at 92–94 (describing the use of tax opinions in the
tax shelter transactions of the 1990s and 2000s).
69. See generally Hatfield, supra note 8 (describing legal ethics writings by tax lawyers
promoting the gatekeeping function).
70. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 314 (1965), reprinted in 51 A.B.A. J. 671
(1965).
71. Id.
72. Id. At the time of the 1965 Opinion, the relevant ethical canons contained heightened
ethical rules regarding certain disclosures and other matters applicable to attorney interactions
with the courts. For the analogous modern rules regarding candor toward tribunals, see MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2011).
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as there was a “reasonable basis” for the position. 73 In reaching its
conclusion, the 1965 Opinion completely ignored the reality of the selfassessment system and the taxpayer’s legal obligation to report their
correct tax liability. Given the low Government audit rate, a lawyer’s
advice to take an extreme tax return position without specific disclosure
to the Government would most often result in a de facto final
determination that the position was correct, rather than merely
indicating that the position would not be considered fraudulent or
frivolous by a court in litigation. 74 Despite its logical flaws, the 1965
Opinion was in line with the popular conception, 75 including that of the
courts, 76 of tax law interpretation as a completely objective economic

73. Formal Op. 314, supra note 70. While the “reasonable basis” standard was not
specifically quantified in the 1965 Opinion, and arguably may have been misinterpreted by some
then-practitioners, over time the accepted view has become that a “reasonable basis” reflects
approximately a 20% chance of success on the merits. See 26 U.S.C. § 6694(a)(2)(B) (2006)
(providing the reasonable basis standard for disclosed positions).
74. Gwen Thayer Handelman, Constraining Aggressive Return Advice, 9 VA. TAX REV. 77,
91–93 (1989).
75. See, e.g., Legal Tax-Dodging Upheld by Morgan, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1937, at 27 (noting
J.P. Morgan’s statements that “taxation is a legal question . . . not a moral one” and that
“Congress should know how to levy taxes and if it doesn’t know how to collect them, then a man
is a fool to pay the taxes”). To see that this sentiment retains currency today, one need merely
note the reaction of the 2012 Republican presidential nominee, Mitt Romney, who responded to a
question regarding his personal tax situation as follows: “My view is I have paid all the taxes
required by law. I don’t pay more than are legally due and, frankly, if I had paid more than are
legally due I don’t think I’d be qualified to become president. I’d think people would want me to
follow the law and pay only what the tax code requires.” Transcript: ABC News’ David Muir
Interviews Mitt Romney, ABC NEWS (July 29, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/transcriptdavid-muir-interview-mitt-romney/story?id=16881787#.UF-0w42PWSo.
76. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935) (“The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease
the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the
law permits, cannot be doubted.”); Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390, 395–96 (1930)
(“The only purpose of the vendor here was to escape taxation . . . . The fact that it desired to
evade the law, as it is called, is immaterial, because the very meaning of a line in the law is that
you intentionally may go as close to it as you can if you do not pass it.”); Bullen v. Wisconsin,
240 U.S. 625, 630–31 (1916) (“[W]hen the law draws a line, a case is on one side of it or the
other, and if on the safe side is none the worse legally that a party has availed himself to the full
of what the law permits. When an act is condemned as an evasion what is meant is that it is on
the wrong side of the line indicated by the policy if not by the mere letter of the law.”); Comm’r
v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850–51 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J., dissenting) (“Over and over again
courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so arranging one’s affairs as to keep taxes as low
as possible. Everybody does so, rich or poor; and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to
pay more than the law demands: taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions. To
demand more in the name of morals is mere cant.”); Helvering v. Comm’r, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d
Cir. 1934) (“[A] transaction, otherwise within an exception of the tax law, does not lose its
immunity, because it is actuated by a desire to avoid, or, if one choose [sic], to evade, taxation.
Any one [sic] may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound
to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to
increase one’s taxes.”), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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calculus imbued with no moral, ethical, or societal considerations. 77
Similarly, the pro-taxpayer stance in the 1965 Opinion coincided with a
decrease in certain broader societal norms that had acted as a
counterbalance to this amoral approach to taxpaying obligations. 78
The reasonable basis standard set forth in the 1965 Opinion became
the accepted standard used by tax practitioners in providing tax return
advice for the next twenty years. 79 Tax shelter activity exploded during
this period. 80 These tax shelters typically involved creating investment
vehicles that promised investors large tax benefits. 81 Typically, the
claimed tax benefits for the investments were justified based on tax
opinions provided by tax lawyers involved in developing the underlying
investment transaction. 82 Unfortunately for all involved, these opinions
typically did not forthrightly address the relevant law, were based on
77. For a defense of using patriotic and moral justifications in favor of tax compliance efforts,
see Richard Lavoie, Patriotism and Taxation: The Tax Compliance Implications of the Tea Party
Movement, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 39 (2011).
78. For instance, the Great Depression, and tax protests in the early 1930s, prompted national
and local “pay your taxes” campaigns initiated by various interested parties to boost compliance
at a time of great budgetary and national strain. See DAVID T. BEITO, TAXPAYERS IN REVOLT:
TAX RESISTANCE DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION 101–29 (1989) (describing the effect of the
“pay-your-taxes” movement in response to the Chicago tax strike). Similarly, during World War
II, the United States went so far as to have Walt Disney produce a cartoon featuring Donald Duck
as a reluctant taxpayer who is ultimately swayed to pay his taxes in order to help defeat the Axis
powers. Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the Expansion of
the Income Tax during World War II, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 685, 716 (1989). Finally, in the postwar
period, prominent lawyers highlighted patriotic reasons for paying taxes in order to support the
Government, asserting it was a vital component in the effort to defeat the communist threat to
capitalism. Hatfield, supra note 8, at 11–13. However, as the Cold War dragged on (eventually
giving way to détente) and the public became disenchanted with the personal and financial toll of
the Vietnam War, these societal forces (i.e., patriotic sentiment engendered by World War II and
the Cold War) supporting tax adherence began to weaken.
79. It was not until 1985 that the ABA modified the reasonable basis standard out of concern
that some practitioners were interpreting it to be a lower level of certitude than intended. ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985), reprinted in 39 TAX
LAW. 631, 631 (1986) (“The Committee is informed that the standard of ‘reasonable basis’ has
been construed by many lawyers to support the use of any colorable claim on a tax return to
justify exploitation of the lottery of the tax return audit selection process. This view is not
universally held, and the Committee does not believe that the reasonable basis standard, properly
interpreted and applied, permits this construction.”).
80. George K. Yin, Getting Serious about Corporate Tax Shelters: Taking a Lesson from
History, 54 SMU L. REV. 209, 210–15 (2001) (describing generally the scope of the tax shelter
problem in the 1970s and 1980s).
81. Often these were real estate investment partnerships exploiting the use of nonrecourse debt
financing made possible by a 1947 Supreme Court decision. See Crane v. Comm’r, 331 U.S. 1
(1947). See also Christian C. Day, Commissioner v. Tufts: The Fall of Footnote 37; The
Confirmation of The Functional Relationship, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 803, 803 (1984).
82. James Holden, New Professional Standards in the Tax Marketplace: Opinions 314, 346
and Circular 230, 4 VA. TAX REV. 209, 212–17 (1985) (illustrating the syndicated tax shelters of
the period and the role of tax opinions in facilitating these transactions).
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incorrect factual assumptions, or failed to actually state the likelihood of
success if the transaction were questioned by the Government. 83 While
the number of tax attorneys actually involved in drafting such opinions
and promoting these tax shelters was relatively small, the broader tax
bar failed to effectively dissuade both their colleagues from engaging in
this activity and the public from pursuing these aggressive
transactions. 84
As a result of the failure of the tax bar to effectively curtail the
creation and use of these tax shelter opinions, the Government was
forced to intervene more directly. In the early 1980s, to address certain
aspects of the tax shelter problem, the Government proposed, and
ultimately adopted in modified form, specific provisions of Circular 230
regulating the content of tax opinions used in these tax shelter
transactions; 85 enacted various tax penalty provisions; 86 sanctioned
increased disclosure, reporting and procedural requirements; 87 and
passed numerous substantive changes to the tax law. 88 Similarly, courts
83. Id. See also SPECIAL COMM. ON THE LAWYER’S ROLE IN TAX PRACTICE, THE ASS’N OF
CITY OF N.Y., THE LAWYER’S ROLE IN TAX PRACTICE (1983), reprinted in 36
(1982–1983) (depicting generally the tax lawyer’s role in syndicating tax
shelters).
84. While the investments made by individuals in these syndicated tax shelters often would
not be of sufficient magnitude to warrant investors seeking an independent opinion on the tax
consequences, ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (revised)
(1982), reprinted in 68 A.B.A. J. 471, 471 (1982), one would have expected the organized bar to
take a more public stand regarding this type of shelter activity. While the bar ultimately did act to
provide guidance in Formal Opinion 346, id., that opinion came only after many years of
tolerating this type of tax shelter activity and only after the Government had proposed
amendments to Circular 230 to directly regulate practitioner behavior that the bar felt were overly
strict. See Tax Shelters; Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 45 Fed. Reg. 58, 594
(1980) (proposed Aug. 29, 1980) (proposing standards for providing opinions promoting tax
shelters); Holden, supra note 82, at 217–18 (describing proposals requiring practitioners to
exercise due diligence and issue favorable overall opinions).
85. While the Government’s initially proposed amendments to Circular 230 were viewed by
many practitioners as too strict, the changes ultimately adopted ended up instead as essentially
codifying the core ethical standards the bar had adopted in Formal Opinion 346. Holden, supra
note 82, at 222–24; Amendments to Circular 230, 49 Fed. Reg. 6719 (1984) (reporting final
regulations).
86. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6659 (2006) (valuation overstatement penalty); 26 U.S.C. § 6661
(2006) (the substantial understatement penalty); 26 U.S.C. § 6700 (2006) (penalty for promoting
abusive tax shelters); 26 U.S.C. §§ 6707–6708 (2006) (penalty for failing to furnish information
regarding tax shelters).
87. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6045(e) (2006) (real estate transaction reporting); 26 U.S.C. § 6111
(2006) (promoter registration of tax shelters); 26 U.S.C. § 6112 (2006) (maintenance of investor
lists by organizers and sellers of tax shelters); 26 U.S.C. §§ 6221–6231 (2006) (partnership audit
rules); 26 U.S.C. § 7408 (2006) (injunctive action against promoters of abusive tax shelters).
88. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 1250 (2006) (depreciation recapture rules); 26 U.S.C. § 704(b)
(2006) (partnership allocation rules); 26 U.S.C. § 163(d) (2006) (investment interest limitations);
26 U.S.C. § 465 (2006) (at-risk loss limit rules); 26 U.S.C. §§ 1092, 1256 (2006) (straddle rules).
THE BAR OF THE
TAX LAW. 865
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actively fought against such tax shelter activity. 89 While this type of tax
shelter activity dissipated in the years following these changes, their
contribution to that result is unclear since it appears that an unrelated
statutory change—the adoption of the passive activity loss rules in
1986 90—was the primary factor in the demise of this type of tax shelter
activity. 91
2. The Tax Shelters of the 1990s
Contemporaneously with the widespread tax shelter activity in the
1970s and early 1980s, there was a marked decline in practitioner
adherence to the 1965 Opinion’s reasonable basis tax reporting
standard. 92 As a result, the ABA revisited the question of the proper tax
reporting certitude standard and adopted Formal Opinion 85-352 of the
ABA’s Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (“1985
Opinion”). 93 The 1985 Opinion restated the relevant ethical standard
for an attorney to counsel a tax return position as one that had “some
realistic possibility” of success if litigated. 94 While this standard was
somewhat higher than the former reasonable basis benchmark, its
underlying premise was essentially the same as that of the 1965
Opinion. Both opinions considered filing tax returns as an aspect of the
adversarial process and gave no serious consideration to the very
different context between an actually joined adversarial proceeding and
the mere filing of a tax return, especially in light of the necessarily low
89. See, e.g., Estate of Franklin v. Comm’r, 544 F.2d 1045, 1046 (9th Cir. 1976) (rejecting
taxpayer’ deductions); Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583–84 (1978) (holding
that financial transaction cannot solely be shaped by tax avoidance); Hilton v. Comm’r, 74 T.C.
305, 369 (1980) (holding taxpayers could not deduct their distributive partnership losses), aff’d
per curiam, 671 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982); Comm’r v. Tufts,
461 U.S. 300, 317 (1983) (disallowing taxpayers to deduct certain partnership property);
Odend’hal v. Comm’r, 748 F.2d 908, 913–14 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that taxpayers could deduct
interest only to the extent of their property income); Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm’r, 752
F.2d 89, 96 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that sham transactions do not entitle taxpayer to depreciate
deductions).
90. See 26 U.S.C. § 469 (2006).
91. See Yin, supra note 80, at 218–20; Christine Rucinski Strong & Susan Pace Hamill,
Allocations Attributable to Partner Nonrecourse Liabilities: Issues Revealed by LLCs and LLPs,
51 ALA. L. REV. 603, 607 (2000).
92. Holden, supra note 82, at 235.
93. Formal Op. 85-352, supra note 79.
94. Id. Since most tax advice and tax opinion work by practitioners would not fall within the
specific strictures of the syndicated tax shelter rules then embodied in Formal Opinion 346 and
Circular 230, the “realistic possibility” certitude level set forth in the 1985 Opinion became the
primary ethical consideration for practitioners following its adoption. David Weisbach & Brian
Gale, The Regulation of Tax Advice and Advisers, 130 TAX NOTES 1279, 1285 (2011). Phrased
in terms of percentages, a realistic possibility of success was considered to represent a 33%
chance of success on the merits. See authorities cited in supra note 35.
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Government audit rate and the intended functioning of the selfassessment system. 95 Thus, the relevant ethical guideline applicable to
tax practitioners in planning situations was only marginally higher in
the post-1985 period than it had previously been. 96
Similarly, while the 1980s heralded some changes in the civil
penalties faced by taxpayers, the basic penalty structure remained one
that left significant room for taxpayers and their legal advisors to
undertake aggressive tax-motivated transactions. In rendering planning
advice in the early 1990s, a tax lawyer primarily needed to consider
only whether the proposed transaction would expose the client to either
a negligence penalty 97 or a substantial understatement penalty. 98 As a
general matter, a taxpayer could avoid both of these penalties if he
obtained and relied in good faith on an opinion of counsel supporting
the claimed position. 99 If the underlying transaction giving rise to the
claimed tax benefit was one in which “the” principal purpose was the
evasion or avoidance of tax—a “tax shelter” under federal law 100—then
the opinion as a practical matter needed to find that the position was
more likely than not correct. 101 However, since a tax shelter for
purposes of the substantial understatement penalty only existed when
the tax motive exceeded that of any other motive, transactions with
business or profitmaking purposes would generally not be covered by
this more likely than not standard. In those cases, a taxpayer avoided
any penalty for taking the position so long as “substantial authority”
existed for the position. 102 In non-tax shelter situations where
95. Durst, supra note 54, at 1047.
96. Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Cooperative Tax Regulation, 41 CONN. L. REV. 431, 470 (2008);
Soled, supra note 39, at 291; Beale, supra note 35, at 628–29.
97. Former 26 U.S.C. § 6662(b)(1) and former 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-3. The negligence penalty
was inapplicable as long as a reasonable basis existed for the taxpayer’s position (or a realistic
possibility of success existed if the position was directly contrary to certain published authorities).
98. Former 26 U.S.C. § 6662(b)(2) and former 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-4. The substantial
understatement penalty became applicable once an underpayment surpassed a threshold level, but,
as discussed below, could be avoided if the taxpayer had “substantial authority” for his reporting
position or if the position was adequately disclosed (provided a tax shelter transaction was not
involved).
99. This was true both due to the operation of the specific penalty provisions and due to an
overarching “reasonable cause” exception under then section 6664. That section provided that no
penalty would be applied to a taxpayer that was found, based on all the facts and circumstances,
to have made a good faith effort to determine his proper tax liability (which could be shown by
reasonable reliance on an opinion of counsel).
100. Former 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C); former 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-4(g)(2).
101. Technically, to avoid the penalty if a tax shelter was involved, the taxpayer need to show
(1) that “substantial authority” existed for the position, and (2) that the taxpayer had a reasonable
belief that the position taken was “more likely than not” correct. Id. A taxpayer’s reasonable
belief could be premised on a tax opinion stating a more likely than not conclusion. Id.
102. If no tax shelter were involved, then the substantial underpayment penalty would be
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substantial authority was ultimately found lacking, the taxpayer could
often escape penalty due to reliance on a tax opinion finding that
substantial authority existed. 103
Thus, at the start of the 1990s, a tax practitioner could ethically
counsel in favor of taking any position for which there was a realistic
possibility of success. In some cases, however, the adviser would also
have to alert the client to the need for disclosure of the position to
eliminate the risk of penalties. Further, by supplying the client with a
tax opinion at a substantial authority level, or in tax shelter situations at
a more likely than not level, the tax practitioner could effectively
insulate the client from potential civil penalties for taking the position.
This was the ethical and statutory backdrop for the wave of tax shelter
activity that occurred in the 1990s and early 2000s.
Unlike the prior era of tax shelters, which focused on syndicating tax
loss transactions to individual taxpayers based largely on abusing the
non-recourse debt rules, the new wave of tax shelters was developed to
exploit a wide variety of vagaries in the tax law and then confidentially
marketed to corporations and wealthy individuals as tax savings
templates that could be readily adapted to the particular client’s
situation. 104 The two periods were similar, though, in that aggressive
tax opinions and advisors played a central role in both creating and
failing to impede these aggressive transactions. Again, in the face of
the bar’s unwillingness or inability to regulate its own behavior, the
Government was forced to intercede with specific rules regulating the
furnishing of tax planning advice and significant changes to the civil
penalty provisions applicable to taxpayers.
The Government significantly expanded the rules in Circular 230
regarding written tax advice well beyond the narrow rules applicable to
the syndication tax opinions of concern in the 1970s and 1980s. Today,
Circular 230 contains detailed guidelines governing a wide variety of

inapplicable as long as either (1) substantial authority existed for the position, or (2) the position
was non-frivolous and it was adequately disclosed on the tax return. Former 26 U.S.C. §
6662(b)(2) and former 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-4. While a tax opinion concluding that substantial
authority existed obviously would not be conclusive regarding whether substantial authority
actually did exist, the taxpayer’s reasonable reliance on such an opinion would generally allow
him to escape a penalty under the good faith exception of section 6664 even if the tax opinion
turned out to be incorrect.
103. Weisbach & Gale, supra note 94, at 1288. See also supra note 99 (discussing the
reasonable cause exception).
104. See generally Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers, supra note 11, at 49–50; Joseph
Bankman, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 TAX NOTES 1775, 1777 (1999); U.S.
DEP’T OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS
(1999).
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written advice provided in tax planning situations. 105 These rules were
specifically intended to “send a strong message to tax professionals
considering selling a questionable product to clients” and to “rein in
practitioners who disregard their ethical obligations.” 106 Generally, the
core requirements of these new rules for covered opinions are that tax
advisors must be more vigilant in their factual inquiries, forthrightly
deal with all the legal issues, 107 and explicitly reach a conclusion that
the proposed tax treatment of an issue is at least more likely than not
correct or, if there is only a lesser confidence level, explicitly disclose
that the taxpayer cannot rely on the opinion for penalty protection
purposes on that issue. 108
In tandem with its direct regulation of practitioners’ written tax
advice, the Government also made numerous changes in the relevant
civil penalty provisions applicable to taxpayers. In general, these
changes were aimed at making it more difficult for taxpayers to avoid
penalties. 109 This goal was accomplished by increasing the certainty
levels required to avoid the penalties, as well as by making it more
difficult to use reliance on a tax opinion as a basis for exception from a
penalty. 110 For instance, while the baseline requirement today for
avoiding a substantial understatement penalty on non-tax shelter
positions remains a substantial authority confidence level, the definition
of “tax shelter” has been significantly expanded to include any plan or

105. 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.35–10.37 (2011). The main rules related to “covered opinions.” A
covered opinion is defined as any written advice regarding: (1) any transaction that is the same or
substantially similar to abusive transactions specifically identified by the Government in
published guidance (“listed transactions”),; (2) any plan or arrangement where “the” principal
purpose is tax avoidance or evasion, and most importantly; (3) any plan or arrangement where “a
significant” purpose is tax avoidance or evasion if the opinion (a) expresses at least a more likely
than not assessment on any issue in favor of the taxpayer (a “reliance opinion”), (b) is one the
advisor knows, or has reason to know, will be used by the client or others to promote or market a
transaction to taxpayers (a “marketed opinion”), or (c) is issued in conjunction with the adviser (i)
agreeing to refund a portion of his fees if the taxpayer’s reporting position is not sustained or (ii)
imposing a confidentiality requirement on the client. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35. Written advice not
qualifying as a covered opinion is more lightly regulated under section 10.37.
106. IR-2004-152, 2004 IRB LEXIS 521 (I.R.S. Dec. 17, 2004), available at
http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=132445,00.html. (quoting then IRS Commissioner Mark W.
Everson).
107. “Significant purpose” transactions can be limited to an examination of only certain
issues, but market, listed, and principal purpose opinions must deal with all relevant tax issues.
108. For a more detailed review and explanation of the current Circular 230 rules on written
tax advice, see David T. Moldenhauer, Circular 230 Opinion Standards, Legal Ethics and First
Amendment Limitations on the Regulation of Professional Speech by Lawyers, 29 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 843, 850–67 (2006); Weisbach & Gale, supra note 94, at 1285–87.
109. Weisbach & Gale, supra note 94, at 1288.
110. Id. at 1288–89.
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arrangement with a significant tax avoidance or evasion purpose. 111 If a
substantial understatement of tax relates to such a tax shelter, then the
penalty applies, despite the existence of substantial authority, unless the
taxpayer can satisfy the general reasonable cause exception of 26 U.S.C.
§ 6664. 112 However, some uncertainty exists regarding the exact
circumstances under which the reasonable cause exception is still
available because the relevant regulations under section 6664 have not
been updated to provide guidance regarding how the reasonable cause
standard is to be applied to understatements on individual tax returns
following the various amendments to section 6662. 113
Finally, as in the 1980s, the Government and the courts moved to
strike at the underlying nature of the tax schemes. In the 1980s this was
accomplished through a wide variety of Governmental actions and court
decisions. 114 In combating the more recent wave of tax shelters, the
response included, inter alia, creating a new tax return schedule
requiring certain corporations to specifically disclose uncertain tax
positions, 115 codifying the economic substance doctrine (a judicial
doctrine whose operation was previously subject to debate), 116 and
courts utilizing common law anti-abuse concepts to strike down
aggressive transactions. 117
Following these Government and judicial actions, the latest wave of
tax shelter activity seems to have subsided. 118 Nevertheless, while
insufficient gatekeeping by the tax bar clearly contributed to the growth
of such shelters, it is impossible to quantify the impact of the
111. 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C) (2006).
112. Additionally, if the transaction is found to lack economic substance (within the meaning
of 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o) (2006)) then the reasonable cause exception under section 6664 becomes
inapplicable. Further, for certain reportable transactions incurring penalties under section 6662A,
the requirements under section 6664 for showing reasonable cause are heightened. 26 U.S.C. §
6664(d) (2006).
113. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6664-4 (2011).
114. See supra notes 86–90.
115. See IRS, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FORM 1120 SCHEDULE UTP (2012), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1120utp.pdf.
116. 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o).
117. See ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 253 (3d Cir. 1998); ASA Investerings P’ship
v. Comm’r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 325 (1998), aff’d, 201 F.3d 505 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Black & Decker,
436 F.3d 431, 441–43 (4th Cir. 2006); Coltec Indus. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 2006); TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d 220, 241 (2d Cir. 2006); Jade Trading,
LLC v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 487, 491–93 (2005); Long Term Capital Holdings v. United
States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122, 171 n.68 (D. Conn. 2004), aff’d, 150 F. App’x 40, 2005-2 U.S.T.C. P
50,575 (2d Cir. 2005).
118. Simon, supra note 9, at 1072; Andrea Monroe, What’s in a Name: Can the Partnership
Anti-Abuse Rule Really Stop Partnership Tax Abuse?, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 401, 461 (2010);
Calvin H. Johnson & Lawrence Zelenak, Codification of General Disallowance of Artificial
Losses, 122 TAX NOTES 1389, 1391 (2009).
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Government’s increased direct regulation of tax practitioners in the
waning use of these tax shelters.
B. Factors Contributing to Weakened Gatekeeping
The foregoing discussion demonstrated that while a gatekeeping
function was historically an ethical norm to which the tax bar largely
adhered (at least in practice, even if not specifically acknowledged),
practitioners have increasingly rejected that norm over recent decades.
It may be tempting for some to ascribe the tax shelter activity in modern
times to the work of individual bad apples, or to bemoan the lack of
individual moral character among modern day attorneys. 119 But this
explanation misses the fact that it is not the intrinsic nature of the
individuals involved that has changed. Individuals will always act in
their own self-interest unless constrained by legal or societal
constraints. 120 Despite the immutability of humankind, ethical norms
do not remain static. What is currently ethically acceptable is primarily
a function of society’s prevailing moral framework, as adapted to the
context of the particular subgroup to which the ethical norm is
applicable. 121 So the question is not why individual practitioners today
are “less” ethical than their predecessors, but rather, why does the tax
bar no longer view a gatekeeping function as the appropriate ethical
norm?
While numerous factors and changes over the recent decades have
119. See Roger Colinvaux, Charity in the 21st Century: Trending toward Decay, 11 FLA. TAX
REV. 1, 19 (2011); Morse, supra note 14, at 988; Joseph Bankman, Tax Enforcement: Tax
Shelters, The Cash Economy, and Compliance Costs, 31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 9 (2005).
However, the widespread nature of the tax shelter market in the 1990s and early 2000s belie the
plausibility of merely ascribing the activity to “bad apple” taxpayers and tax practitioners.
Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law, supra note 46, at 186.
120. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 91 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge University
Press 1991) (1651); Evelyn Keyes, The Just Society and the Liberal State: Classical and
Contemporary Liberalism and the Problem of Consent, 9 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 45 (2011)
(“All laws are official societal constraints upon individual liberty and equality enforceable by the
State. Laws officially determine who is equal to whom with respect to a given liberty or
constraint and who is in a different position. They determine the boundaries, or scope, of the
liberties we may exercise against each other and the penalties for their infringement. The
enactment of legislation is thus integral to the generation and maintenance of the just society.”);
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“If men were
angels, no government would be necessary.”).
121. Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law, supra note 46, at 126. See also Keyes, supra note
120, at 60 (“[T]he entire moral purpose of legislation, including both negative constraints and
positive rights, is to enact and maintain through a moral and rational process those laws the
people themselves deem both fair to each and conducive to the safety and happiness of all. When
unfairness is perceived in the societal constraints upon negative or positive liberty or in the
distribution of social goods, or when the need appears for legislation more conducive to fairness
or prosperity, legislators are responsible for making equitable corrections to the law.”).
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undoubtedly contributed to the shift in the ethical reality of tax practice,
four overarching areas of change can be easily identified as highly
significant in altering the ethical perceptions of the tax bar: (1) evolving
client norms for ethical behavior; (2) increasing competitive pressures
on legal service providers; (3) changing judicial approaches to statutory
interpretation; and (4) a lessening imperative favoring taxpaying in
society as a whole.
1. Client Norms for Ethical Behavior
One of the key factors supporting the existence of a gatekeeping
norm was the belief that by steering a client away from overly
aggressive transactions, the tax lawyer was in fact acting in the client’s
best interest. Implicit in this position was the assumption that the client
agreed that (1) a taxpayer has a duty to forthrightly pay its allocable
portion of the nation’s tax liability, and (2) the economic and public
relations costs associated with defending questionable tax transactions
outweighed the benefits from engaging in such transactions. Although
this was the accepted perception in the 1950s, matters have changed
drastically since then. While in the past business ethics were
substantially coextensive with the prevailing morality of society, today
there exists a schism where a businesswoman will think nothing of
undertaking an action on behalf of her business that would not be
condoned as a matter of personal behavior. 122 The creation of a
separate business ethical culture has been driven by the idea that the
proper focus of a corporation is the creation of profits for its owners. 123
As a result, while businesses may highlight their socially responsible
actions as a public relations and marketing matter, shareholder profits
remain king. 124
In such an environment, moral and ethical
122. Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law, supra note 46, at 168–69.
123. See David Campbell et al., Social Welfare, Positivism, and Business Ethics, 11 BUS.
ETHICS: A EUR. REV. 263, 268, 273 (2002) (discussing the ongoing conflict between business
ethics and the drive for profits). See also Gordon Pearson, Making Profits and Sweet Music, 9
BUS. ETHICS: A EUR. REV. 191, 191 (2000) (noting that business ethics is a distraction that can
lure a company away from its focus).
124. John Philip Jones, Global Business: Oversight without Inhibiting Enterprise, 603
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 262, 264 (2006) (“[Corporate social responsibility
(“CSR”)] has little real influence on the operating policy of major companies. From a large
sample of such companies, it was found for instance that their donations to charity account for
less than 1 percent of their pretax profits. To such companies, CSR may have benefits from the
public relations standpoint, but that is about all.”). Proponents of CSR often take the position that
companies should place doing good for society above the bottom line. See, e.g., M. Todd
Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the Market for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L.
REV. 571, 581 (2009). However, many argue that, in practice, CSR efforts are merely co-opted
by businesses for public relations and marketing purposes. Michael B. Runnels, Elizabeth J.
Kennedy, & Rev. Timothy B. Brown, S.J., Corporate Social Responsibility and the New
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considerations are perceived as at most window dressing and therefore
they have no power to curb behavior harmful to society. As a result, the
key constraints on any economically justified business behavior are
almost exclusively those actually imposed by law. 125 But how are these
legal constraints best applied? From a purely competitive vantage
point, the goal of business is to minimize the impact of any legal
constraints that do exist. Hence, the direction from clients to their
lawyers is clear: interpret the law as narrowly as possible and without
reference to moral or ethical considerations. The focus on the bottom
line within the business world contributes to the perception that legal
advisors serve merely as “hired guns” to further the goals of the
client. 126 The function of lawyers, while more than mere scriveners,
became merely implementing exogenously determined business goals
rather than being active participants in helping to shape, channel,
modify, or (heaven forbid) question those announced goals. In the face
of such clear client-driven directives to achieve legal conclusions
consonant with the business bottom line, it became very difficult, if not
impossible, for an attorney to justify a gatekeeping role as being in line
with his client’s perceived best interests.
2. Legal Services Norms
As the prevailing business culture began to devalue the lawyer’s role
as a counselor, lawyers themselves began to devalue that role. 127 This
trend found a traditional antecedent in the historical place of zealous
advocacy in litigation. Further, just as clients were succumbing to
competitive pressures to focus solely on their bottom line profit,
competitive pressures were building in the legal marketplace. Where
lawyers practicing in law firm settings had traditionally provided legal
services, there was a move by businesses to pull more legal talent inhouse. 128 This development not only gave these in-house lawyers a
Governance: In Search Of Epstein’s Good Company in the Employment Context, 43 AKRON L.
REV. 501, 532 (2010); Edwin M. Epstein, The Good Company: Rhetoric or Reality? Corporate
Social Responsibility and Business Ethics Redux, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 207, 212 (2007).
125. Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law, supra note 46, at 169.
126. Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America’s Governing Class: The Formation and
Dissolution of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer’s Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 381, 381 (2001). See generally RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 247
(Oxford 1989) (“[L]awyers are hired guns: they know they are, their clients demand that they be,
and the public sees them that way.”); MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING
LAWYERS’ ETHICS 72 (3d ed. 2004) (describing the history of client-centered representation);
Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1, 2–3 (2005) (same).
127. Pearce, supra note 126, at 381.
128. See also JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
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more myopic view of their role in serving the client, but also provided
businesses with their own sophisticated legal capabilities. This
movement towards in-house law practice both decreased the revenue
flowing to law firms by taking away many run-of-the-mill legal
questions 129 and provided clients with the ability to question legal
advice and take a more active role in shaping the guidance ultimately
provided by their outside counsel. 130
Finally, lawyers began facing competition from accounting firms and
consulting groups that added lawyers as employees and partners to
provide expanded advice to their clients. 131 While these newly hired
lawyers could not draft operative documents for clients without running
into issues regarding the unauthorized practice of law by their nonlicensed employers, 132 they could provide sophisticated tax planning
advice tailored to their client’s desires. 133 The expansion of accounting
GOVERNANCE 195 (2006); David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the
Corporate Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067, 2071–72, 2113–14 (2010)
(discussing the different roles and skill sets of in-house and outside counsel).
129. COFFEE, supra note 128, at 224. See also Robert J. Rhee, On Legal Education and
Reform: One View Formed from Diverse Perspectives, 70 MD. L. REV. 310, 324 (2011) (“The
rise of in-house counsel has led to greater price transparency and opportunities to rationalize legal
services, resulting in greater economic pressure on external attorneys.”).
130. Wilkins, supra note 128, at 2071 (“Due in large measure to the growth of in-house legal
departments, corporate clients today have a far greater ability to hold their lawyer-agents to fullthroated standards of partisan advocacy . . . .”).
131. Matthew A. Melone, The Patenting of Tax Strategies: A Patently Unnecessary
Development, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 437, 478–79 (2007); Rostain, supra note 11, at 88–
92.
132. Since the time of the Great Depression, state bar associations have actively sought to
prevent non-lawyers, especially accountants, from engaging in the unauthorized practice of law.
Kathryn Lolita Yarbrough, Multidisciplinary Practices: Are They Already among Us?, 53 ALA.
L. REV. 639, 641 (2002). These efforts led to the adoption of ethical rules effectively prohibiting
lawyers from engaging in multi-disciplinary practices (MDPs) (essentially a firm in which
lawyers and nonlawyers share their fees). Id. This approach continues today in the model rules,
which provide that a “lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities
of the partnership consist of the practice of law.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b)
(2011). Notwithstanding this limitation, accounting firms began claiming that their attorney
partners and employees were not practicing law based on traditional (and federally sanctioned)
exceptions allowing accountants to represent clients in federal tax matters. John S. Dzienkowski
& Robert J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice and the American Legal Profession: A Market
Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM
L. REV. 83, 110–12 (2000); Laurel S. Terry, A Primer on MDPs: Should the “No” Rule Become a
New Rule?, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 869, 881–82 (1999). The one function such firms typically
eschewed was the actual drafting of contracts and other operative documents, since that activity
carried a higher risk of being seen as the actual practice of law. Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra, at
111–12.
133. The effective ability of accounting firms to engage in MDPs in the tax realm led the
ABA to reconsider its historic prohibition on MDPs in the late 1990s. However, the ABA’s
House of Delegates rejected the proposed relaxation of the MDP prohibition. See generally Paul
D. Paton, Multidisciplinary Practice Redux: Globalization, Core Values, and Reviving the MDP
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and consulting firms into the tax law market was further exacerbated by
the international operations of many businesses and the integration of
legal and accounting functions in many international jurisdictions. 134
Thus, tax lawyers were faced not just with competition from other law
firms, but also with competition from in-house legal functions and nonlegal service providers. In turn, such competition, coupled with clients
who were both less loyal to their historical outside legal counsel 135 and
more willing to take their business to the provider who would sanction
their preferred interpretation of the law, inevitably led to a race to the
bottom in legal services, 136 where transactions were judged using the
lowest common denominator of technical compliance with the literal
terms of the law. 137
3. Judicial Norms of Statutory Interpretation
A related factor in attorney perceptions regarding the appropriateness
of a tax gatekeeping role derived from the judiciary’s attitude toward
tax avoidance and statutory interpretation. 138 This factor is particularly
significant because it directly contributes to the dynamic encouraging
the previously discussed factors. Historically, the judiciary took a nonliteral approach to interpreting tax statutes and developed numerous
judicial anti-abuse doctrines aimed at curbing overly aggressive
taxpayer positions. 139 Even as courts formally endorsed the position
that structuring transactions to minimize taxation was permissible, they
Debate in America, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2193 (2010) (providing a history of the MDP debate).
The prospect for relaxation of the MDP prohibition was recently raised in the context of the
ABA’s Ethics 20/20 initiative, but the Ethics 20/20 committee has recently announced that it will
not propose any change to the nonlawyer ownership prohibition. Press Release, ABA Comm’n
on Ethics 20/20, ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 Will Not Propose Changes to ABA Policy
Prohibiting Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Firms (Apr. 16, 2012), available at http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20120416_news_release_re_non
lawyer_ownership_law_firms.authcheckdam.pdf.
134. Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 132, at 113–17; Gianluca Morello, Note, Big Six
Accounting Firms Shop Worldwide for Law Firms: Why Multidiscipline Practices Should Be
Permitted in the United States, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 190, 190–94 (1997).
135. See COFFEE, supra note 128, at 194–96 (discussing the change in the economic
relationship between corporate lawyer and client and how this led to a decrease in loyalty by
corporate clients to their outside counsel).
136. Simon, supra note 9, at 1072–73 (noting that ideology and self-interest could equally
lead business lawyers to either a “gladiator” or “gatekeeper” model, and that under the “gladiator”
approach, “we would expect lawyers . . . to compete for clients in terms of their relative
willingness to assist in the evasion or frustration of costly regulation through aggressive planning
and litigation . . . and to embrace, or at least tolerate, a race to the bottom”).
137. Beale, supra note 35, at 597; Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers, supra note 11, at 55–
59.
138. Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law, supra note 46, at 183.
139. Id. at 177–78 (and cases cited therein).

6_LAVOIE

846

3/9/2013 1:36 PM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 44

typically rejected the particular tax-motivated transaction in the case
before them. 140 Thus, while the law created a line between acceptable
and unacceptable behavior, the edges of that line were often ill-defined.
In creating a level of uncertainty regarding the exact boundaries of
the law, courts fashioned an atmosphere conducive to an efficient and
fair self-assessment system. When taxpayers and practitioners knew
that courts could be expected to reject legal positions based on
unintended literal interpretations of the law or to reach results at odds
with the tax policy underlying the law, they were encouraged to be more
circumspect and evenhanded in their initial tax positions. Taxpayers
were less inclined to view the law as merely a system of specific rules
to be gamed by clever artifice since such attempts could be expected to
fail. Similarly, practitioners were on stronger footing in dissuading a
taxpayer from undertaking a tax-motivated transaction since the
likelihood of the transaction withstanding judicial scrutiny was greatly
reduced. Thus, a strong judicial norm of dynamic interpretation of tax
statutes promoted a gatekeeping function by effectively aligning the
interests of both clients and practitioners. Expanding the area of
uncertainty regarding the exact reach of the tax law restored some of the
legal constraints on overly aggressive planning and created room for
attorneys to assert ethical considerations as relevant when navigating
the zone of legal uncertainty, thereby allowing both ethical and legal
considerations to act as constraints on aggressive taxpayer actions. 141
140. For illustration, the following, seemingly pro-taxpayer quotations all come from cases
where the taxpayer nevertheless lost. See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935)
(“The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or
altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted.”). Superior Oil Co.
v. Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390, 395–96 (1930) (“The only purpose of the vendor here was to escape
taxation . . . . The fact that it desired to evade the law, as it is called, is immaterial, because the
very meaning of a line in the law is that you intentionally may go as close to it as you can if you
do not pass it.”); Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625, 630–31 (1916) (“When the law draws a line,
a case is on one side of it or the other, and if on the safe side is none the worse legally that a party
has availed himself to the full of what the law permits. When an act is condemned as an evasion
what is meant is that it is on the wrong side of the line indicated by the policy if not by the mere
letter of the law.”); Comm’r v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850–51 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.,
dissenting) (“Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so arranging
one’s affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does so, rich or poor; and all do
right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law demands: taxes are enforced
exactions, not voluntary contributions. To demand more in the name of morals is mere cant.”);
Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934) (“[A] transaction, otherwise within an
exception of the tax law, does not lose its immunity, because it is actuated by a desire to avoid,
or, if one choose [sic], to evade, taxation. Any one [sic] may so arrange his affairs that his taxes
shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the
Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes.”), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465, 469
(1935) .
141. Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law, supra note 46, at 179.
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As the judiciary moved away from this traditional approach to tax
cases, it created uncertainty regarding how the law should be viewed
and forced practitioners to directly face the conflict between
representing their clients zealously and their role in maintaining a fair
and efficient functioning of the self-assessment system. 142 Corporate
taxpayers who saw the judiciary upholding the aggressive tax
transactions of their competitors felt compelled to engage in such
activity themselves. 143 This was both a competitive necessity and a
breaking down of the moral norm of paying one’s fair share of the
country’s tax burden. By giving full voice to JP Morgan’s view that
taxation was a purely legal matter devoid of moral concerns, 144 rather
than mere lip service, the judiciary bolstered the emerging business
focus on profits and cost-benefit analysis as the only legitimate
constraints on behavior. In turn, business clients generally had no
patience for attorneys who attempted to dissuade desired transactions
based solely on ethical or anti-abuse notions. Lawyers not acceding to
this new reality found themselves at a distinct disadvantage.
Further, even lawyers who traditionally would have advised against
aggressive transactions based on non-literal legal interpretations and
anti-abuse notions had to question the validity of their own legal
reasoning. At its core, the job of a lawyer is to predict the future for his
clients. As courts muddied the water regarding how they would
approach the application of tax statutes, the attorney’s job became much
more difficult. Even if a particular attorney believed a tax-motivated
transaction was too good to be true, one that she would not uphold if she
were a judge, she would know that a judge with a more literalist
disposition might well condone the transaction. 145 How could the
attorney in good conscience advise a client against a transaction when
an identified segment of the judiciary would likely find the transaction
perfectly legal? Given the lawyer’s clear ethical duty to assist her
client and the undeniable competitive pressure facing her, it is little
wonder that even practitioners predisposed to undertaking a gatekeeping
function chose to abandon that older ethical norm as a viable standard
for ongoing behavior.
4. Decreased Societal Impetus toward Taxpaying
Finally, broader changes in American society influenced the tax bar’s
view of its gatekeeping role. Historically, there was a moral component
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 190–91.
Id. at 181–82.
See supra note 75.
Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law, supra note 46, at 182–83.
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to taxpaying in the United States. 146 While this began to give way in
the 1930s, 147 World War II saw a renewed patriotic impetus toward
taxpaying. 148 Even after the War, the United States found itself locked
in an ideological struggle with Communism that supported a taxpaying
impetus on the public. 149 However, as society moved beyond these
periods of crisis, 150 the viewpoint that taxation was purely a forced
extraction of wealth from citizens without any moral or ethical
component began to reassert itself. 151
Since the mid-1960s, the country has seen a general decline in the
level of respect for, and trust in, government and other institutions. 152
The portion of Americans who responded that the federal government
can be trusted “to do what is right” most of the time or just about always
fell from 76% in 1964 to 30% in 2008. 153 This general decline in trust
had a direct impact on tax compliance. 154 As society moved further
146. See, e.g., JOHN S. WISE, A TREATISE ON AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 74 (1905) (depicting
tax evasion as unpatriotic and faithless).
147. See Assaf Likhovski, The Duke and the Lady: Helvering v. Gregory and the History of
Tax Avoidance Adjudication, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 953, 997–1000 (2004) (discussing the
changing judicial, legal, economic, and political views on taxation and tax avoidance that began
to emerge in the 1920s, and the shift from moral to “amoral discourse on tax avoidance”).
148. See Jones, supra note 78, at 716 (discussing income tax propaganda in American films
during World War II).
149. Hatfield, supra note 8, at 11–13.
150. John R. Alford, We’re All in This Together: The Decline of Trust in Government, 1958–
1996, in WHAT IS IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT THAT AMERICANS DISLIKE? 28, 45–49 (John R.
Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse eds., 2001) (suggesting that in the United States a low level of
trust in the government is the norm, and that external threats to the country cause that trust to
increase temporarily).
151. Lawrence Zelenak, Justice Holmes, Ralph Kramden, and the Civic Virtues of a Tax
Return Filing Requirement, 61 TAX L. REV. 53, 65–69, 78–79 (2007) (noting the decline in media
perceptions of taxpaying obligations from strong portrayals of honest taxpayers in the 1950s and
1960s, to mixed messages in the early 1970s, to apparent endorsements of tax cheating in the
1990s; and linking this decline in part to societal changes during that period that have weakened
public trust in government to tax and spend wisely).
152. SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET & WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, THE CONFIDENCE GAP: BUSINESS,
LABOR AND GOVERNMENT IN THE PUBLIC MIND 15 (Johns Hopkins University Press rev. ed.
1987) (1983) (“[T]he early 1960s turned out to be a high-water mark in the history of the
American public’s attitudes toward their key social, political and economic structures.”); Anthony
King, Distrust of Government: Explaining American Exceptionalism, in DISAFFECTED
DEMOCRACIES 74, 95–97 (Susan J. Pharr & Robert D. Putnam eds., 2000) (noting as causes of
increased distrust of government, among other things, the public reaction to the Vietnam War and
Watergate, the resurgence of federalism, and the increased polarization and declining civility of
political discourse).
153. THE AM. NAT’L ELECTION STUDIES, THE ANES GUIDE TO PUBLIC OPINION AND
ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR tbl.5A.1 (2010), available at http://electionstudies.org/nesguide/toptable/
tab5a_1.htm.
154. See Kornhauser, supra note 25, at 873–75 (noting that distrust of government has
increased markedly since the mid-1960s and highlighting the linkage between such decreased
trust and decreased taxpayer compliance with the law); Lavoie, Taxpaying Ethos, supra note 18,
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away from the ideal that taxpaying was a moral and patriotic duty, the
role of tax attorneys in advising their clients shifted as well. Indeed,
these same societal forces can be seen behind the general decline in
respect for attorneys since the mid-1960s. 155
III. THE FUTURE OF TAX GATEKEEPING
The foregoing discussion reviewed the historical arguments for and
against a gatekeeping norm in the tax arena and demonstrated that a
gatekeeping norm existed in the past, but has been largely abandoned
today. This Part addresses the question: Should we care? And if we do
care, what can be done to reinvigorate and reestablish a gatekeeping
norm within the tax bar?
A. Whither (or Wither) Tax Gatekeeping?
This Article takes the position that we should care and that it is
worthwhile to resurrect a gatekeeping function for the tax bar. The
main rationale in support of this view is that an attorney’s role as a
zealous advocate should and must be circumscribed to ensure that the
self-assessment system functions properly and that taxpayers continue
to perceive the tax system as fair. A breakdown in respect for the tax
system could well lead to widespread tax avoidance and a collapse of
the stable taxpaying ethos in the United States. 156 A strong gatekeeping
norm within the tax bar can help forestall this possibility and promote
the rule of law.
The historical argument that an ethical gatekeeping norm was
unnecessary because it was sufficiently covered by an attorney’s general
ethical obligations 157 has clearly been refuted by the waves of tax
shelter activity in recent decades. At the same time, the very existence
of this tax shelter activity can be utilized to argue against continuing to
assert a gatekeeping norm. 158 This argument uses the failure of the
at 650–55.
155. Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public Opinion, Jokes,
and Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 805, 811–16 (1998) (noting 1960 as a possible high
point for public respect for lawyers, which was followed by a marked descent in media portrayals
of attorneys from “unalloyed” heroes to “flawed” and “morally ambiguous” figures).
156. See generally Lavoie, Taxpaying Ethos, supra note 18, at 660–71 (arguing that trust in
Government and other taxpayers supports tax compliance).
157. Hatfield, supra note 8, at 22–24, 31–32.
158. Watson, Duty Reconsidered, supra note 55, at 1198, 1236–37 (arguing against the
traditional “duty to the system” standard and for legislatively creating a normative standard to
which tax practitioners must adhere “because it is now painfully clear that relying on an
ideological “‘duty to the system’ has not worked”). A gatekeeping ideal “should be a normative
one in which clear expectations are firmly established, and the ability of all tax practitioners to
comply is feasible in practice. But this has not been the case, and that has led to our present
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historical gatekeeping norm to prevent past tax shelter waves as
evidence that the traditionally articulated gatekeeping obligation was
too ill-defined to serve as an enforceable normative guide for actual
practitioner actions. 159
Therefore, according to this argument,
advocating for a gatekeeping function is a misguided effort that will
never stand up to the competitive pressures practitioners face and thus
can never serve as a realistic constrain on aggressive taxpayer behavior.
It is undoubtedly true that practitioners abysmally failed as
gatekeepers during periods of tax shelter activity in the past forty years.
However, this observed failure is most likely due to the rejection of
gatekeeping as a legitimate ethical norm by a majority of practitioners,
despite the legal academy routinely asserting during this period that a
gatekeeping role existed for tax lawyers. 160 As discussed earlier, ethical
behavior is ultimately determined by the specific culture (or subculture) creating the norm. 161 Merely stating that any particular norm
should exist in a society is nonsense, and attempting to impose a norm
from the outside, without the means and will to enforce it, is an exercise
in futility. 162 To be effective, an ethical norm must reflect the
consensus of those to whom it applies and be subject to effective
internal enforcement. 163 While gatekeeping within the tax bar has often
been proclaimed as the accepted ethical norm, at least since the 1965
Opinion, that has never been the ABA’s formal opinion.
Thus, it is disingenuous to suggest that the tax bar should not attempt
to reach a consensus in favor of a gatekeeping role merely because a
true consensus with formal adoption by the bar has not existed in recent
times. The goal of this Article is to propose a means by which the tax
bar may be encouraged to shoulder this burden on its own initiative in a
manner that will give both form and reality to an ethical gatekeeping
norm.
An alternative response may be that Government actions have
already interceded to such a degree that recognizing an ethical norm of
gatekeeping is irrelevant and unnecessary today. Following the
Government’s recent changes to Circular 230, 164 the civil penalty
problems.” Id. at 1198.
159. Id. at 1220–22.
160. See supra notes 9 and 11 and accompanying text (discussing commentators’ belief that
tax attorneys have an obligation to promote a fair system and the rejection of this obligation by
tax attorneys in recent decades).
161. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (noting that the prevailing moral framework
in society determines what is ethically acceptable).
162. Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law, supra note 46, at 136–38.
163. Id. at 138.
164. See supra notes 105–08 and accompanying text (discussing the current Circular 230 and
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provisions, 165 the codification of the economic substance doctrine, 166
and its efforts to increase taxpayer disclosure of questionable
transactions, 167 there is little discretion left to tax advisors to promote
abusive transactions or assist their clients in pursuing such schemes. 168
In effect, the failure of the bar to come to a consensus and enforce an
ethical gatekeeping norm has led the Government to impose the
functional equivalent as a matter of law—as evidenced by the recent
downturn in tax shelter activity. 169
Of course, if this position is correct, then the bar should have no
problem formally adopting and embracing an ethical gatekeeping norm
that merely confirms the existing legally imposed reality.
Unfortunately, we see no impetus to conform the ABA’s formally
announced standards to this supposed new reality. 170 Further, the
nature of a legally imposed rule is that it applies only in the specific
circumstances covered, and we have seen how adept the tax bar can be
in finding loopholes in structures of legally imposed rules. 171 If there is
no ethical standard to backstop the Government’s imposed rules, then
there is no incentive to prevent attorneys from exploiting any areas not
specifically governed by the legally imposed rules. In these gap areas,
tax attorneys would be free to pursue the same destructive tax shelter
activity that has occurred in recent decades.
the ethical obligations it imposes on written tax advice given by tax attorneys).
165. See supra notes 109–13 and accompanying text (discussing changes to civil penalty
provisions that make it more difficult for taxpayers to avoid penalties associated with taxavoidance transactions).
166. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (summarizing this judicial doctrine that was
codified to combat the most recent wave of tax shelter activity).
167. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing Form 1120 Schedule UTP that
requires certain corporations to disclose uncertain tax positions).
168. See, e.g., Watson, Duty Reconsidered, supra note 55, at 1237 (noting that legislation
would allow fewer opportunities for tax attorneys to promote aggressive positions).
169. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (suggesting that the 2008 economic downturn
also played a role in slowing tax shelter activity).
170. Neither the ABA generally nor its Section of Taxation, Standards of Tax Practice
Committee have scheduled projects to reconsider the continued viability of the 1985 Opinion, the
1965 Opinion, or tax attorney ethical standards generally in light of the recent legislative and
Circular 230 changes. See Michael Hatfield, The Tax Section’s Ethics Debate—Historical
Reflections, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 7, 2011, LEXIS 2011 TNT 173-9 (noting a debate held at
the May 2011 ABA Section of Taxation meeting over whether Circular 230 should incorporate
the reporting standards set forth in the section 6694 return preparer penalty standards—as the
Government subsequently did—or retain the “realistic possibility” standard that the ABA had
adopted in the 1985 Opinion—as the Tax Section was advocating—and summing up the debate
by noting that attendees remained closely divided on the issue and concluding that “there
continues to be ambivalence in the tax bar about the transformation of professional ethics into
professional regulation”).
171. See supra note 15 (quoting various legal professionals describing the tax bar’s ability to
develop tax shelters).
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While it may turn out that the current set of rules provides an allinclusive barrier to attorney participation in tax shelter activity, there is
reason to be skeptical of this conclusion. After the amendments to
Circular 230 in the 1980s and the adoption of statutory rules to curtail
tax shelter transactions, tax shelter activity dropped for a few years
before new tax shelter schemes arose in the 1990s. 172 While the
Government’s actions spelled the demise of certain types of tax shelters,
the drop off in activity may have merely resulted from the retooling of
the industry. Conversely, the decline in present day tax shelter activity
may be due more to the fact that taxpayers have less income and gain to
shelter as a result of the worst economic downturn in the United States
since the Great Depression. 173 When the economy turns around in the
coming years, it is likely that we will once again see more pressure for
tax shelter transactions. Whether the Government’s current rules will
effectively contain that pressure remains to be seen.
As a final point in favor of attempting to refine and reassert a tax
gatekeeping norm, it should be noted that reaching consensus on such a
norm is in the best long-term interest of both the bar and clients. The
changes to Circular 230 and the penalty provisions in response to the
tax shelter wave in the 1990s have placed significant additional burdens
on practitioners and their clients. 174 These rules have clearly put real
constraints on the relationship between clients and their attorneys and
arguably dissuade the provision of some legitimate tax advice and
planning. 175 Should lawyer-assisted tax shelter activity become
rampant again, the bar should expect the Government to impose even
more draconian restrictions on it. Taking concrete steps today to
prevent future abuses and thereby forestall any further potentially
overbroad and restrictive government intrusions into the attorney-client
relationship should be supported as in the best interest of all involved.
B. Creating an Accepted and Sustainable Gatekeeping Norm
If a gatekeeping norm is desirable in the tax area, but appears to no
longer exist, what can be done to create one anew? Most commentators
in the last few decades have maintained that tax practitioners do in fact
172. The tax shelters of the 1970s and 1980s fell out of use following the adoption of the
passive activity loss restrictions in 1986. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
173. Kaye, supra note 14, at 604. For a detailed discussion of the economic downturn, see
JERRY M. ROSENBERG, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE GREAT RECESSION 2007-2010
(2010).
174. See generally Weisbach & Gale, supra note 94, at 1279–80 (discussing the changes to
the regulatory structure in response to the proliferation of tax shelters in the 1990s).
175. Charles A. Rose, Note, The Tax Lawyer’s Dilemma: Recent Developments Heighten Tax
Lawyer Responsibilities and Liabilities, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 258, 260–62.
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have an ethical gatekeeping obligation. 176
This Article has
demonstrated that while, as a tax policy matter, such an ethical
obligation should exist—and did exist at least for a time—the modern
reality of tax shelter activity belies its continued survival. The problem
is that ethical rules, and for that matter even rules of law, are worthless
if they are not truly accepted and internalized by the group governed by
such rules. Thus, if a gatekeeping norm is desirable, merely
proclaiming its existence will by itself do little to bring that norm into
actual existence. This is especially true when powerful forces, both
internal and external to the group, push members of the group toward
retaining the existing norm. 177 Reestablishing a gatekeeping norm
within the tax bar requires changing the existing culture of the tax bar,
which in turn requires altering or exploiting various elements of the
broader societal milieu in which the tax bar operates.
1. Reaching Consensus and Announcing a Standard
The imposition of an ethical rule on a group does not guarantee that
the rule will be followed. To achieve a practical reality, the rule must
be generally accepted as correct by those subject to it, 178 and be subject
to effective enforcement mechanisms to dissuade non-compliant
behavior. 179 Essentially, there must be a consensus regarding the rule
for it to have legitimacy. Consequently, internally debated and
176. See supra notes 9 and 11 (listing various recent legal articles that advocate for a
gatekeeping function within the tax bar).
177. See Maggi Carfield, Participatory Law and Development: Remapping the Locus of
Authority, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 739, 770 (2011) (“It is undeniable that cultures are dynamic and
change over time. But . . . [u]nless there is some internally driven desire to change, reformers
will likely encounter a great deal of resistance. Change is likely to be a more organic and
incremental process.”); Tanina Rostain, Ethics Lost: Limitations of Current Approaches to
Lawyer Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1273, 1321 (1998) (“[P]rofessional norms that comprise
the zealous advocate ideal may work against attempts to deter lawyers from conduct that harms
the legal framework. Put simply, a lawyer may value her reputation as a ‘scorched-earth, takeno-prisoners’ litigator and be willing to risk even severe legal sanctions to maintain it. In
conceding a role for social norms, regulatory legal ethics ultimately forsakes its original project of
developing an account of a regulatory regime to cover an abstract ‘bad’ lawyer—a lawyer
stripped down to a maximizer of short-term financial self-interest. In its place, a regulatory
approach must embark on a more ambitious program. At the very least, it needs a thicker
empirical account of social norms and their interactions with legal norms and market forces.”).
178. Rostain, supra note 177, at 1340 (“For [ethical] regulation to be effective, it needs to be
undergirded by widespread commitments among lawyers to the values reflected in the regulatory
enterprise. A central concern of legal ethics scholarship must be to investigate, articulate, and
shore-up such collective commitments in the context of law practice.”); Eugene R. Gaetke,
Expecting Too Much and Too Little of Lawyers, 67 U. PITT L. REV. 693, 729–30 (2006) (“What
the . . . study suggests . . . is that lawyers will be more likely to obey new rules regarding
professional behavior if the rules reflect values that are moral in their content and are legitimate
in the sense that they are supported by a consensus within the bar.”).
179. Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law, supra note 46, at 117.
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democratically adopted norms are likely to be obeyed, even by those
who did not originally favor the adopted norm. 180 Of course,
establishing consensus around an ethical standard is immeasurably
harder when there is a preexisting standard to the contrary.
This is unfortunately the predicament facing a renewed tax
gatekeeping norm.
While the extant literature maintains that
practitioners have such an ethical obligation, and the Government
informally concurs, the ABA’s pronouncements in the 1965 Opinion
and the 1985 Opinion are premised on treating tax practice as an
adversarial endeavor. 181 Despite the proliferation of tax shelter activity
in the 1990s and the significant changes to Circular 230 and the civil
penalty provisions, the ABA has not revisited the 1985 Opinion.
Further, the broader legal profession has long embraced an allencompassing zealous advocacy norm that is only slowly changing.
The first step in reviving a tax gatekeeping norm is to withdraw the
1985 Opinion and replace it with one explicitly endorsing a gatekeeping
role in tax planning. On its face this presents a “which came first”
problem, since announcing the new ethical norm would help promote
consensus around it, but consensus regarding the norm is presumably an
essential element in adopting the new norm in the first place. However,
consensus is often formed through open discussion. Even though the
required consensus may be presently lacking, if the ABA were to
undertake a new study on the provision of tax advice to clients, a new
consensus could well emerge. Indeed, there are a number of changes in
recent years that could be brought to bear in favor of adopting a
gatekeeping norm, including (1) the growing academic acceptance that
restraining the zealous advocacy norm outside of (and sometimes even
180. See, e.g., James Alm, Betty R. Jackson & Michael McKee, Fiscal Exchange, Collective
Decision Institutions and Tax Compliance, 22 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 285, 301–02 (1993)
(finding higher compliance when a matter is voted on and when the outcome has wide support).
Accord T.R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 19–57, 161–78 (1990) (arguing that people
generally comply with the law if they perceive the process that leads to this law as fair). See also
James Alm, Gary H. McClelland & William D. Schulze, Changing the Social Norm of Tax
Compliance by Voting, 52 KYKLOS 141, 163 (1999) (concluding that individual compliance
behavior can be effected by the outcome of a vote on the strength of an enforcement regime for a
fiscal system); Bruneo Feld & J.R. Tyran, Tax Evasion and Voting: An Experimental Analysis, 55
KYKLOS 197, 218 (2002) (finding that tax compliance is higher on average when subjects are
allowed to approve or reject the proposal because such a vote indicates legitimacy); Benno
Torgler & Christoph A. Schaltegger, Tax Amnesties and Political Participation, 33 PUB. FIN.
REV. 403, 426 (2005) (finding strong evidence that individuals are more compliant when they
have the opportunity to vote and communication among group members occurs prior to the vote);
Benno Torgler, What Do We Know about Tax Morale and Tax Compliance?, 48 INT’L REV.
ECON. & BUS. 395, 395–412 (2001) (surveying literature on political participation and
compliance).
181. See text accompanying supra notes 70–78 and 93–96.
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inside of) litigation is legitimate; 182 (2) the reality of recent direct
regulation of tax practice by the Government; 183 and (3) the risk of even
more draconian Government regulation in the future if the bar’s failure
to effectively self-regulate results in yet another wave of lawyer-assisted
tax shelter activity.
Still, while beginning a real discussion of the proper role of advisors
within the tax bar is a crucial first step if an effective gatekeeping norm
is to be established, there is no guarantee that such discussions would
result in that consensus. Despite the fact that restraining its own
behavior is in the best interest of the tax bar (and its clients) because it
would avoid more Government regulation, powerful forces push the tax
bar in the other direction. These include, among others: (1) competitive
pressures that force attorneys to compete for clients based on tax results
rather than sound advice; (2) outside pressure from clients who engage
in a collaborative approach to obtaining legal advice; and (3) increased
uncertainty regarding the judicial demeanor toward tax planning and
statutory interpretation. If these forces are to be overcome, some
countervailing forces must be put in play to nudge the tax bar toward a
gatekeeping consensus.
2. Seizing the Power of Individual Actions
Changing a cultural norm is not an easy task. Generally, such norms
remain stable and resistant to change. When change occurs, however, it
typically does so quickly rather gradually. 184 This tipping-point nature
182. See generally, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988);
DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION
(2000); Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988); William H.
Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L.
REV. 29. See also Wendel, supra note 3, at 1181–82 (describing the concept of zealous advocacy
norm as a “shopworm aphorism”); Wilkins, supra note 128, at 2067–73 (arguing that necessity of
ethical and regulatory changes that promote the role of attorneys as gatekeepers within modern
day corporate-attorney relationships); David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating
Lawyers after Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1147–51 (1993).
183. See supra notes 105–13 and accompanying text (discussing various recent instances
where the Government has directly intervened with the method in which the tax bar practices, and
where the Government has imposed various restrictions and penalties associated with
questionable tax transactions and advice).
184. Social groups tend to be resistant to social norm change because the internal cohesion of
the group is based in part on a shared belief that is then internally enforced among group
members. However, as greater numbers begin to break free of these internal enforcement
mechanisms and flout the norm, it causes others to question whether the norm to which they are
adhering is truly shared by the group. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION
160–61 (1984). Once this happens, members of the group tend to change their belief to the new
norm to remain attached to their group, with a resulting cascade effect towards the adoption of the
new norm. See Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to
the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225, 1228 (1997). See also Natalie S. Glance &
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of cultural norms highlights an unexpected vehicle for prompting rapid
change, individual action. 185 On its face, it may seem absurd to assert
that the actions of an individual, or a small cadre of individuals, could
lead to a cultural change; but even small changes to a social norm can
precipitate dramatic and rapid changes given the right conditions. 186
This insight builds on modern theories of disease transmission that
model how viruses spread at an exponential rate through a susceptible
population once the number of infected individuals reaches a critical
mass. 187 Essentially, human behaviors can themselves be contagious. 188
In this way, if even a small group of people reject an existing norm,
others seeing their action may decide that they themselves should adopt
it and start an informational or reputational cascade effect. 189 Such
Bernardo A. Huberman, The Dynamics of Social Dilemmas, SCI. AM., Mar. 1994, at 76, 78–79
(using borrowed methods from statistical thermodynamics to study the evolution of social
cooperation, and finding that in such a model there are generally two highly stable minima
representing widespread cooperation and widespread defection, separated by a highly unstable
barrier from which the system slides away to one of the two minima very quickly if ever such a
maximum is reached); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 343 (1984) (explaining how question framing demonstrates preferences
that violate the dominance requirement of rational choice); Richard H. McAdams, Relative
Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1992) (arguing that because humans are social animals, they
constantly compare themselves to others and strive to comport and compete so as to achieve
heightened social status).
185. The concept of “tipping points” in group behavior was first developed by sociologist
Morton Grodzins, who used it to examine the “white flight” phenomenon that occurred when
levels of minority residence began to rise in historically white neighborhoods. Morton Grodzins,
Metropolitan Segregation, SCI. AM., Oct. 1957, at 24. However, the tipping point concept has far
broader implications in explaining how singular events or trendsetter actions can swiftly overturn
preexisting social norms in a wide variety of settings. See generally MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE
TIPPING POINT: HOW LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE (2000).
186. See David Hirshleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads, and
Informational Cascades, in THE NEW ECONOMICS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 209 (Mariano Tommasi
& Kathyrn Ierulli eds., 1995); Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom,
and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992, 993 (1992); Robert
Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86
VA. L. REV. 1577, 1586–89 (2000) (describing how peer-to-peer influences can result in
sometimes dramatic shifts in compliance equilibria); Harvey Leibenstein, Bandwagon, Snob, and
Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers’ Demand, 64 Q.J. ECON. 183, 206–07 (1950).
187. See generally M. Choisy, J.F. Guegan & P. Rohani, Chapter 22: Mathematical Modeling
of Infectious Diseases Dynamics, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES: MODERN
METHODOLOGIES 379 (Michel Tibayrenc ed., 2007) (discussing the various mathematical models
used to analyze epidemic outbreaks based on the critical mass of infected individuals, the number
of susceptible individuals, and other factors).
188. GLADWELL, supra note 185, at 6.
189. An information cascade occurs when individuals decide that others have superior
information and the individuals adopt the position of others on the assumption that they have
superior information. See generally Hirshleifer, supra note 186. Reputational cascades occur
when trend setters adopt a new norm and others follow suit either to curry favor or avoid censure.
Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV.
683, 685–87 (1999).
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snowballing effects draw their strength from the fact that most social
groups strive for homogeneity. 190 This tipping-point effect can apply
both in the context of endorsing a new social norm, as well as
condemning an old one. 191
The same principle applies to ethical situations. While one individual
cannot singlehandedly change the world, he can influence those around
him in ways that ultimately have profound consequences. 192 Imagine a
crowd of people gathered for a peaceful protest. One individual’s
unilateral act of violence does not convert the protesters into a mob.
However, the way that others respond might. If no one objects to the
violence, then that sends a message to others in the crowd that the group
finds violence acceptable, and the peaceful protest may quickly cascade
into mayhem. Conversely, if members of the crowd censure and act
against the initial violence, the peaceful purpose of the group is
reaffirmed and cohesion to the original norm is maintained. One
individual cannot unilaterally impose an ethical change on a group, but
his example can prompt others to question their views. 193 When a
person takes a principled stand in the face of a contrary norm, the
present has been changed for those around him and good may ultimately
result.
This Article presents a plea to practitioners to raise concerns with
clients even when it is uncomfortable to do so. Even if an attorney feels
constrained to provide zealous advice to a client, she should note that
there is still both a moral and purely legal dimension to the question. 194
190. See ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 6–7 (Richard C. Atkinson et al. eds., 7th ed.
1995) (discussing the tendency of most individuals to want to conform their behavior); Dan M.
Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 352–61 (1997)
(discussing social conformity as an element of deterrence).
191. Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67
U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 614 (2000) (“Individuals are also more likely to view conduct as worthy of
condemnation when they know that others condemn it. Indeed, studies suggest that the opinions
of one’s peers more significantly influence one’s moral attitudes toward various forms of conduct
than does the status of those forms of conduct under the law.”)
192. See, e.g., Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 189, at 688–89 (discussing the wide variety of
social movements evidencing cascade theory).
193. Or to tap into the pop culture wisdom of Star Trek: “‘One man cannot summon the
future.’ ‘But one man can change the present!’” Star Trek: Mirror Mirror (NBC television
broadcast Oct. 6, 1967) (discussion in which Captain Kirk urges an alternate-universe Mr. Spock
to work from within to change the brutal Empire he is sworn to defend), quoted in SUSAN
SACKETT, FRED GOLDSTEIN & STAN GOLDSTEIN, STAR TREK SPEAKS 113 (1979).
194. It is important to note that nothing in the zealous advocacy norm in fact prevents lawyers
from raising moral, ethical, or other concerns with clients. To the contrary, the ABA Model
Rules acknowledge that these factors can be incorporated into client advice. See MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2011) (“In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent
professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only
to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social, and political factors that may
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By standing up for a duty to the system and noting the harm a tax
avoidance transaction presents to the system, the practitioner may give
her client or other attorneys dealing with the transaction the strength to
question their own views about the appropriateness of their actions
(even if they are technically legal). By doing so, the attorney not only
impacts the group dynamic within the business ethics context, but
serves as an example that can be the tipping point for other tax lawyers
to question the true ethical norms in play. This is not to say that
speaking out is easy—as it may cause risks for those who do it—but the
more frequently it is done, the better. 195
Outside specific client settings, it is especially important that highprofile tax practitioners and academics take up the cause and publically
advocate for a strong gatekeeping norm since these trendsetters will
have an oversized impact on the behavior of others. 196 Consequently,
anything that can be done to make it easier for attorneys to follow their
conscience should be done to promote individual action and the
importance of individual action itself should not be easily dismissed.
3. Encouraging Gatekeeping
Hastening a consensus regarding tax gatekeeping will require the
creation of incentives for individual attorneys, and the bar as a whole, to
willingly assume a gatekeeping function. 197 One means of achieving
this is to appeal to their self-interest. As discussed earlier, one element
of self-interest—avoiding future Government regulation of the

be relevant to the client’s situation.”).
195. Speaking out in this manner may also hold a silver lining in terms of relieving an
attorney’s personal angst regarding his role in past questionable transactions and his anxiety over
the psychic costs he will incur struggling with such transactions in the future if nothing changes.
196. See Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 37–
38 (2010) (“But oftentimes change is only possible through the facilitation of specific types of
individuals, variously known as ‘change agents,’ ‘opinion leaders,’ and ‘norm entrepreneurs,’
whose native abilities and social positions can encourage others to adopt a new norm. They may
have extensive and diverse personal relationships that allow the rapid spread of new ideas. They
may have knowledge about a vast array of issues or a technical expertise that gives credibility to
the information and opinions they provide. They may be especially convincing in their
arguments and possess a high ‘social intelligence’ that lets them recognize the value of change.
Or they may have a combination of these and other attributes.”).
197. Of course, internal motivations are also important. One’s internal self-image may be
linked to being an honest person and acting ethically in all their affairs. Consequently, the
importance of general indoctrination into the ethical nature of gatekeeping should not be
overlooked. For instance, tax LL.M. programs might consider making a tax ethics course a
required element of their degree. Based on the author’s research, currently only one (Boston
University) of the top six tax LL.M. programs (New York University, Georgetown University,
University of Florida, Northwestern University, Boston University, and Miami University) makes
ethics a required course.
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profession—is already present. 198 Other factors, however, discourage
attorneys from counseling clients against aggressive positions, including
a fear that raising concern about technically legal transactions would
result in losing that client’s future business. To change this dynamic, it
is necessary to (1) create a conflict of interest that requires attorneys to
raise the broader ethical considerations despite general business distain
for such considerations, and/or (2) change the prevailing business norms
to be more receptive to considerations other than profit maximization
and strict legal compliance.
One way of creating such a conflict of interest would be for the
Government to pursue a more public and targeted enforcement effort
that focuses on clients who previously participated in an aggressive

198. The ABA’s recent experience with efforts to subject lawyers to increased money
laundering and terrorist funding reporting is a case in point. The Financial Action Task Force
(“FATF”) is an international organization focused on combatting money laundering and terrorist
financing. Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the Financial Action Task Force and Its 2008
Lawyer Guidance, 2010 J. PROF. LAW. 3, 5–6. The FATF has made a number of
recommendations in this regard (the “FATF 40+9 Recommendations”) which cover the
gatekeeping obligations of various intermediaries (including lawyers) who could inadvertently
facilitate money laundering and terrorist financing activity. See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, FATF
40 RECOMMENDATIONS (2003), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/
FATF%20Standards%20-2040%20Recommendations%20rc.pdf; FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, 9
SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS (SR) ON TERRORIST FINANCING (TF) (2004), available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/8/17/34849466.pdf. More recently, the FATF issued specific
guidance for lawyers regarding the FATF 40+9 Recommendations. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE,
RBA GUIDANCE FOR LEGAL PROFESSIONALS (2008), available at http://www.fatfgafi.org/dataoecd/5/58/41584211.pdf. FATF members (including the United States) are charged
with implementing the FATF 40+9 Recommendations. Terry, supra, at 6–7. The FATF 40+9
Recommendations include gatekeeper guidelines regarding, among other matters, customer due
diligence, recordkeeping, and the obligation to report suspicious transactions (without tipping off
clients). Id. at 10. While in some jurisdictions these gatekeeping recommendations have been
implemented by applying them in a fulsome manner to attorneys, the United States has yet to do
so. Id. at 36. Instead, the ABA has been involved in proactive efforts to shape any anti-money
laundering obligations that might eventually be imposed on U.S. attorneys and is pursuing
increased self-regulation regarding these matters. See generally Kevin L Shepherd, The
Gatekeeper Initiative and the Risk-Based Approach to Client Due Diligence: The Imperative for
Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for U.S. Lawyers, 2010 J. PROF. LAW. 83 (discussing the
current and proposed U.S. implementation of the FATF 40+9 Recommendations and the ABA’s
responses). Significantly, in 2010 the ABA House of Delegates adopted a set of best practices
guidelines in this area. ABA, VOLUNTARY GOOD PRACTICES GUIDANCE FOR LAWYERS TO
DETECT AND COMBAT MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING (2010), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/2010/annual/pdfs/116.authchec
kdam.pdf. Hopefully, such self-regulation efforts can avoid the need for more intrusive direct
government regulation. Letter from ABA President Stephen Zack (Apr. 8, 2011), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/2011/2011apr08_goodpractices_o.au
thcheckdam.pdf (“[B]y following the Voluntary Guidance, lawyers and the legal profession can
help eliminate the need for federal legislation or agency regulations that could conflict with
existing state bar ethical rules, interfere with and undermine the confidential attorney-client
relationship, and adversely affect client service.”).
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transaction. This effort would have a two-pronged effect: when
advising a particular client who is seeking aggressive advice, the
practitioner would need to consider not only the interests of the current
client, but also the interests of his other clients and his own future
livelihood. If being overly zealous for one client puts other clients at a
higher risk for audit, then that conflict of interest could prompt the
attorney to temper his advice. Acceding to the aggressive advice
desired by a client would also potentially jeopardize the attorney’s
future earnings since other clients would be less inclined to hire a
representative who would draw heightened scrutiny to them. Indeed,
such publicized enforcement activity can help reduce the competitive
pressures that lead to a legal race to the bottom. A taxpayer who knows
that aggressive tax planners serve as audit lightning rods has an
incentive to seek out practitioners who have a good reputation with the
Government, and presumably are more evenhanded in their legal
conclusions. 199
The Government could also take a more direct approach to
intentionally create conflicts of interest between tax lawyers and their
clients. For instance, the Government could modify the attorney-client
privilege 200 in tax situations or override normal client confidentiality
rules 201 by legally requiring certain disclosures to the Government of
specified client actions. 202 Indeed, in promulgating regulations dealing
199. An alternative means to achieve this impact would be to require taxpayers to disclose on
their tax return that they received negative advice regarding a particular transaction or position
taken on the return. Thus, even if they were able to ultimately shift responsibility to a lawyer
with a more lenient bent, they would still need to disclose the earlier negative advice. Thus, a
lawyer potentially issuing negative advice would have more sway to persuade the client to pursue
a less aggressive course rather than merely having the client simply shop for more lenient advice.
200. In 1975, Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence (Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat.
1926 (1975)), which consciously left the law of evidentiary privileges to common law
development. Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 501 provides that the federal common law of
privileges applies to federal question and federal criminal cases, while state law privilege rules
are applicable to cases in federal courts where state law is at issue. FED. R. EVID. 501.
Consequently, the federal common law attorney-client privilege is applicable for federal income
tax issues absent future Congressional action to circumscribe the privilege. Significantly, client
identity is generally not protected under the attorney-client privilege, even in tax shelter
situations. Richard Lavoie, Making a List and Checking It Twice: Must Tax Attorneys Divulge
Who’s Naughty and Nice?, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 141, 202–04 (2004).
201. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(6) (2011) (limiting attorney
confidentiality if disclosure otherwise required by law).
202. For instance, as part of implementing the FACTA 40+9 Recommendations, some
countries have explicitly subjected attorneys to their strict anti-money laundering laws. Terry,
supra note 198, at 29–36. Such direct Government action raises the real risk of overreaching by
the Government. Government interventions in the attorney-client relationship should therefore be
narrowly tailored to address targeted situations where attorney driven self-regulation has been
shown to be insufficient to address the Government’s legitimate interests. Some have questioned
the appropriateness of applying money laundering and terrorist funding reporting obligations to
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with the disclosure of certain reportable transactions, the Government,
perhaps inadvertently, created just such a conflict of interest. 203 Of
course, at the extreme, the Government could potentially eliminate all
privilege or confidentiality for tax planning matters and then even
require practitioners to report aggressive client activity. 204 But this is
exactly the type of Government interference with the profession that
most everyone would agree would be detrimental to all involved.
However, targeted Government actions touching on these matters at the
margins could be effective in encouraging attorneys to generally
distance their legal considerations from their client’s business goals and
highlighting in a tangible way the real risk to the tax bar associated with
a continued unwillingness to effectively self-regulate.
4. Relieving the Anti-Gatekeeping Pressure
Another way to encourage attorneys to question the advisability of
aggressive but arguably legal transactions is to make such
considerations more germane to clients, and thereby relieve some of the
outside pressures acting to suppress a gatekeeping function. A primary
reason why tax lawyers hesitate to raise issues regarding aggressive tax
planning is that their clients are unlikely to be receptive to such “nonlegal” advice coming from their legal advisors. 205 Businesses in the
United States are focused primarily on their bottom line and
consequently view the law as merely a system of rules to be gamed for
the sole goal of profit maximization. 206 Under this approach, as long as
a transaction is technically “legal” then it should be pursued to obtain
the expected economic benefit irrespective of any non-financial
considerations. 207 This perception is compounded by the conventional
attorneys on the ground that lawyers are only infrequently implicated in such activities. Terry,
supra note 198, at 12. Conversely, when it becomes apparent that the bar is integrally involved in
facilitating actions legitimately disfavored by the Government (like the two tax shelter waves
previously discussed), direct regulation of the attorney-client relationship can be more easily
justified.
203. 26 C.F.R. § 301.6112-1 (2011). This regulation requires any material advisor to a
reportable transaction (as defined in 26 C.F.R. § 1.6011-4(b)(1) (2011)) to maintain a list of
investors involved in such transaction which must be furnished to the Government upon request.
204. See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Child Abuse Reporting Laws and Attorney-Client
Confidences: The Reality and the Specter of Lawyer as Informant, 42 DUKE L.J. 203, 269–72
(1992) (noting that the attorney-client privilege is essentially a matter of court and legislative
grace that could be eliminated except in certain narrow criminal situations where the privilege
might claim a Constitutional basis).
205. Wilkins, supra note 128, at 2075–76.
206. William Bradford, Beyond Good and Evil: The Commensurability of Corporate Profits
and Human Rights, 26 NORTE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB POL’Y 141, 148 (2012).
207. Jill E. Fisch, The “Bad Man” Goes To Washington: The Effect of Political Influence on
Corporate Duty, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1602 (2006).
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wisdom that taxpaying is an area of purely legal inquiry, devoid of any
moral considerations, 208 and by general societal trends that weaken the
taxpaying norm. 209 A tax lawyer’s ability to counsel against this
approach is made almost impossibly difficult when the judiciary
actually endorses such a literalistic approach to interpreting the tax
laws. 210 Given the uncertainty today regarding judicial attitudes, a
lawyer may find it extremely difficult to refuse to advise against an
aggressive transaction where a literalist court may uphold the
transaction. Consequently, clarifying the proper method of statutory
interpretation in tax cases is absolutely crucial to reestablishing a tax
gatekeeping norm. 211 While recent court decisions have moved back
toward traditional anti-abuse notions in scrutinizing tax-motivated
transactions, the underlying schism within the judiciary and the tax
academy regarding the interpretation of statutes remains. 212 While the
Government has taken an important step toward clarifying this matter
by codifying the economic substance doctrine, more should be done to
solidify judicial approaches in this area and thereby reduce the
uncertainty for practitioners in predicting the likely judicial response to
an aggressive transaction.
There are several mechanisms by which this could be accomplished.
First, a general anti-abuse rule could be statutorily adopted. 213 This has
been done in several countries with generally positive effects, despite
practitioner criticism. 214 Alternatively, given the long history of
judicially created anti-abuse doctrines in the United States, a simpler
208. See supra notes 75–76 (discussing how courts and public figures do not believe that
moral considerations are in any way implicated when an individual uses the law to avoid paying
taxes).
209. See supra Part III.B.4 (illustrating the general trend in distrust for the government and the
accompanying shift in seeing taxpaying as an extraction of wealth rather than a patriotic duty).
210. Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law, supra note 46, at 190–92.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 195–99.
213. Id. at 195.
214. See, e.g., Benjamin Alarie, Trebilcock on Tax Avoidance, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 623, 624–
25 (2010) (noting how a prolific author on tax law criticized the idea of an effective general antiavoidance rule (“GAAR”) and believed that courts will continue to strictly interpret tax codes
indefinitely); Julie Cassidy, “To GAAR or Not to GAAR—That is the Question:” Canadian and
Australian Attempts to Combat Tax Avoidance, 36 OTTAWA L. REV. 259, 259, 312–13 (2004)
(depicting how both Canada and Australia have enacted GAAR rules and how the Canadian
GAAR has certain provisions that are especially helpful for preventing tax evasion through
aggressive tax planning); Graeme S. Cooper, International Experience with General AntiAvoidance Rules, 54 SMU L. REV. 83, 84 (2001) (reviewing how many countries around the
world have enacted GAAR rules); Tim Edgar, Building a Better GAAR, 27 VA. TAX REV. 833,
836 (2008) (expounding how in countries that have not enacted GAARs there is a continuous
debate about enacting a GAAR because judicially made anti-avoidance doctrines are seen as
ineffective).
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approach would be to merely statutorily reaffirm the appropriateness of
courts continuing to apply such doctrines, and to eschew literal
interpretations of the tax code that are at odds with the intended purpose
and scope of the subject provisions. 215
Another approach for making businesses more receptive to
cautionary advice from their attorneys would be to alter the business
culture of their clients using public censure. 216 In the past, public
outcry over corporations expatriating to avoid U.S. taxes was used to
question, or try to reverse, a number of such transactions. 217 Today,
many corporations pay very low effective tax rates. 218 Exposing such
rates might well create a public outcry demanding that corporate
citizens pay their fair share of the tax burden. 219
CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated that the tax bar’s failure to effectively
constrain its actions on behalf of clients has forced the Government to
impose constraints on the tax bar through direct regulation. As has
happened with securities lawyers, this direct Government regulation
215. Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers, supra note 11, at 62–63.
216. Joshua D. Blank, What’s Wrong with Shaming Corporate Tax Abuse, 62 TAX L. REV.
539, 539 (2009); Sandeep Gopalan, Shame Sanctions and Excessive CEO Pay, 32 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 757, 758–59 (2007); David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811,
1812 (2001).
217. Orsolya Kun, Corporate Inversions: The Interplay of Tax, Corporate, and Economic
Implications, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 313, 344 (2004); Developments in the Law—Jobs and Borders:
VI. Drawing Lines around Corporate Inversion, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2270, 2274–75 (2005).
218. See Citizens for Tax Justice Says ‘No-Tax’ Corporations Continue to Avoid Taxes, TAX
NOTES TODAY, Apr. 10, 2012, LEXIS 2012 TNT 69-19 (noting a report showing that twenty-six
large U.S. corporations paid no U.S. taxes in 2011); CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, CORPORATE
TAXPAYERS AND CORPORATE TAX DODGERS 2008–10, at 3 (2011), available at http://www.
ctj.org/corporatetaxdodgers/CorporateTaxDodgersReport.pdf (finding the average effective
corporate tax rate in 2009 and 2010 for 280 large U.S. corporations was 17.3%, with a quarter of
the companies studied paying below 10%).
219. See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Doing the Full Monty: Will Publicizing Tax
Information Increase Compliance?, 18 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 95, 104–05 (2005)
(“Publicity strengthens penalties because it increases the chance of getting caught (since members
of the public, especially tax experts, can study returns) and it increases chances of public shaming
for non-compliance.”); Marc Linder, Tax Glasnost’ for Millionaires: Peeking behind the Veil of
Ignorance along the Publicity-Privacy Continuum, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 951, 975
(1990) (advocating for the publication of millionaires’ tax returns); Stephen W. Mazza, Taxpayer
Privacy and Tax Compliance, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1065, 1144 (2003) (“Empirical research and
compliance theories also support this position, suggesting that publicity can play a positive role in
discouraging noncompliant behavior and increasing the public’s commitment to the tax system.”);
Paul Schwartz, The Future of Tax Privacy, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 883, 895–96 (2008) (noting how
corporate tax information is publically available through SEC’s online EDGAR database); Joseph
J. Thorndike, Show Us the Money,123 TAX NOTES 148, 148–49 (2009) (discussing how public
disclosure of individuals’ tax returns could prompt tax reform).
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could become even more onerous if the tax bar fails to embrace a strong
gatekeeping function on its own. 220 In order to preserve the traditional
and important tax planning role of attorneys in business and personal
situations, the bar must be willing to curb its support for aggressive tax
planning techniques. This will require a departure from traditional
notions that every client must be represented zealously without
consideration of ancillary adverse consequences to society or third
parties (including the attorney himself). This standpoint is in line with
both the historical approach to practicing tax law, as well as emerging
trends arguing in favor of a general obligation of attorneys to
counterbalance their zealous advocacy for a client against a duty to
support and strengthen the substantive body of law in which they
practice.
The tax bar should begin a forthright discussion of these issues
immediately, with the goal of reaching a strong consensus in favor of
adopting a formal ethical gatekeeping norm. Achieving this consensus
will require weakening the competitive and other forces that align
attorneys too closely with clients’ profit maximization goals. But with
sufficient resolve on the part of a cadre of attorneys who see the stakes
involved, these forces can be overcome.
Looking beyond the tax bar, the impact that the degradation of a
gatekeeping norm in the tax area has had on tax practitioners should
serve as a warning to all lawyers to heed calls for a gatekeeping
function in their particular fields. While historically it has been argued
that the tax field is unique in this regard due to the self-assessing nature
of the income tax, that uniqueness is less true today. As the United
States moves ever closer to a regulatory state where more and more
individual and business actions are circumscribed by detailed statutory
and regulatory frameworks, attorneys will be increasingly called upon
to promote adherence to these rules. A zealous advocacy norm will
promote gamesmanship within these frameworks and ultimately harm
the rule of law. Additionally, many of the forces described herein that
have caused tax practitioners to eschew their historical gatekeeping
function find direct analogues in other practice areas. The tax
experience provides a cautionary tale for the entire bar on the
importance of affirmatively embracing a gatekeeping function as a
means of saving a zealous advocacy norm that otherwise could be
completely swept away.

220. See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text (illustrating the various forms of
Government regulation that have already been levied against the tax bar).

